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Exclusivity Without Patents: The New
Frontier of FDA Regulation for
Genetic Materials
Gregory Dolin, M.D.·
ABSTRACT: Over the last twenty years, the legal and scientific academic
communities have been embroiled in a debate about the patent eligibility of
genetic materials. The stakes for both sides could not be higher. On one
hand are the potential multi-billion dollar profits on the fruits of research
(from newly discovered genes), and on the other is scientists' ability to
continue and expand research into the human genome to improve patients'
access to affordable diagnostic and therapeutic modalities. This debate is
currently pending before the Supreme Court, which is considering a petition
for certiorari in Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office.
Both sides have legitimate concerns. Given the unique nature of DNA,
patents that broadly cover genetic materials and prevent their use (except by
the license of the patentee) create insurmountable roadblocks for future
research. However, denying exclusive rights to the fruits of laborious and
costly research will remove the necessary incentives for investment in these
endeavors, thus delaying scientific and medical discoveries.
To remedy these problems, this Article proposes a non-patent exclusivity
system administered by the Food and Drug Administration. Under such a
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system, the innovators who bring new therapeutic or diagnostic products to
market would receive exclusive rights to market their products Jor a limited
time. This regime would provide sufficient market-based incentives to
continue with the research and investment in this area. At the same time,
because genetic sequences would no longer be broadly protected by patents,
the public would be able to access these basic research tools without Jear oj
infringement litigation. This approach addresses the concerns oj both sides
to the debate and leads to a cheaper, more predictable, and easier to
administer system oj exclusive rights.
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EXCLUSIVITY WITHOUT PATENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1982, the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO")
"issued the first gene patent to the Regents of the University of California for
work carried out" on a bacterium.' Since then, genetic research, gene
isolation and purification, and genetic engineering have gained steam."
Concomitantly, attempts to obtain patents on the results of these new
scientific endeavors have also skyrocketed. 3 Applications on gene patents
have been filed in the United States, Canada, Japan, and the European
Patent Offices.4 The patents granted on these applications number in the
tens of thousands.5 With all patents, the decision whether or not to permit
patenting of a certain category of inventions generally rests with the national
patent authorities 6 and is based on considerations of public policy? and
whether patenting that category would be beneficial or detrimental to the

I.
Edward Weck, Note, Exclusive Licensing of DNA Diagnostics: Is There a Negative Effect on
Quantity and Quality of Healthcare Delivery That Compels NIH Rulemaking?, 31 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 1057, 1062 (2005); see also U.S. Patent No. 4,363,877 (filed Apr. 19, 1978) (issued Dec.
14,1982 ).
2.
See, e.g., Larry I. Palmer, Disease Management and Liability in the Human Genome Era, 47
VILL. L. REV. 1,20 (2002); Andrew W. Torrance, Gene Concepts, Gene Talk, and Gene Patents, 11
MINN.J.L. SCI. & TECH. 157, 19(}-91 (2010); Cara Koss, Note, Oysters & Oligonucleotides: Concerns
and Proposals for Patenting Research Tools, 25 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. LJ. 747, 754 (2007).
3. Omid E. Khalifeh, The Gene Wars: Science, the Law and the Human Genome, 9 Loy. L. &
TECH. ANN. 91, 102 (2010); Cydney A. Fowler, Comment, Ending Genetic Monopolies: How the
TRIPS Agreement's Failure to Exclude Gene Patents Thwarts Innovation and Hurts Consumers
Worldwide, 25 AM. U. INT'LL. REv. 1073, 1084 (2010).
4. See generally Melissa Wetkowski, Note, Unfitting: Gene Patent Limitations Too Tight for
United States' Biotechnology Innovation and Growth in Light of International Patenting Policies, 16 Sw.
]. INT'L L. 181, 185-96 (2010) (discussing legal rules applicable to gene patents in the United

States, Europe,Japan, Canada, Australia, and China).
5. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575, 162526 (2003) ("Patentees have acquired thousands of patents on DNA sequences that cover
specific genes or in some cases fragments of genes.").
6. Gretchen Ann Bender, Clash of the Titans: The Territoriality of Patent Law vs. the European
Union, 40 IDEA 49, 51-52 (2000) ("A patent is a statutory right granted to an inventor or the
inventor's assignee by a national government to exclude other people from practicing the
invention disclosed and claimed in the patent specification .... Patent law, like all intellectual
property law, has historically been based on the nation-state and the principle of territoriality.
National governments grant patents to inventors." (footnote omitted».
7. See Marsha J. Ferziger, Comment, Monopolies on Addiction: Should Recreational Drugs Be
Patentable?, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 471, 483 ("The debate over the ethical issues and public
policy concerns inherent in granting patents on living organisms has direct applicability to the
issue at hand. Commentators examining the patentability of biotechnological advances have
recognized that Congress has the authority to limit patent rights in order to advance the
general welfare."); David S. Taylor, Note, The Sinking of the United States Electronics Industry Within
Japanese Patent Pools, 26 GEO. WASH.]. INT'L L. & ECON. 181, 199-200 (1992) ("The grant of a
patent monopoly and the rights thereby conferred with it are permitted because of the benefits
derived from the full disclosure of the invention to the public.").
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advancement of science and human knowledge. s The debate on this topic
has raged in the pages of academic journals, in legislative committees,
national patent offices, and the courts. 9 This is not surprising for several
reasons.
First, unlike other chemical entities, genetic materials are carriers of
information,1O and that information is the same whether the relevant
molecule is created by nature or by human effort .. , Second, this information
is conserved not only as between "naturally occurring" molecules and
artificially engineered ones, but also across essentially all biological
entities.'2 In other words, a genetic sequence carries the same information
whether the sequence appears in a human or in a bacterium. Thus, allowing
patents on any given genetic sequence potentially precludes the use of that
sequence in not just humans, but in all future research. '3
At the same time, laboratory-created genes are chemically and physically
different from those that occur in nature, even if both sets have the same
informational content.'4 Focusing purely on the chemical structure, then,

8. In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 623 (C.C.P.A. 1958) ("[U]nless the public so derives
benefit, unless the patentee, by his disclosure, adds to the sum of human knowledge, ... the
policy of the patent laws would be frustrated.").
9. See Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDozo L. REv. 2257, 2293-94
(2010) (discussing the debate on the propriety of allowing gene patents); David C. Hoffman,
Note, A Modest Proposal: Toward Improved Access to Biotechnology Research Tools by Implementing a
Broad Experimental Use Exception, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 993, 1019 (2004) (noting that the
National Institutes of Health's ("NIH") initial plans to file patent applications on genetic
discoveries "spurred intense debate that has continued" to the present day (footnote omitted».
1o. See Reese McKnigh t, RNA Interference: A Critical Analysis of the Regulatory and Ethical Issues
Encountered in the Development of a Novel Therapy, 15 ALB. LJ. SCI. & TECH. 73, 78 (2004).
1 1. Sean MacKenzie, Note, Recognizing the Building Blocks of Life as Products of Nature:
Association for Molecular Pathology s Rightful Exclusion of Genetic Information from Patentable
Subject Matter, 32 WHIITIER L. REv. 367, 382 (2011).
12.
See RICK! LEWIS, HUMAl"J GENETICS: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 310-11 (10th ed.
2012); Mary B. Mahowald, Genes, Clones, and Gender Equality, 3 DEPAUL]' HEALTH CARE L. 495,
504 n.48 (2000) ("[A]II living species use the same genetic code."); Marshall Nirenberg, The
Genetic Code, Nobel Lecture (Dec. 12, 1968), in PHYSIOLOGY OR MEDICINE 1963-1970, at 372,
390 (1999) ("[M]ost, perhaps all, forms of life on this planet use essentially the same genetic
language, and ... the language is translated according to universal rules."); William C. Mull,
Note, Using the Written Description Requirement to Limit Broad Patent Scope, Allow Competition, and
Encourage Innovation in Biotechnology, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 393, 397 (2004) ("[T]he basic
chemical structure of DNA is the same for all species.").
13. See Andrew S. Robertson, The Role of DNA Patents in Genetic Test Innovation and Access, 9
Nw.]. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 377, 383-85 (2011); Jennifer L. Davis, Comment, The Test of
Primary Cloning: A New Approach to the Written Description Requirement in Biotechnological Patents, 20
SAl"iTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 469, 480-81 (2004); Krista Stone, Note, Written
Description After Ariad v. Eli Lilly: 35 USC § IIZ'S Third Wheel, 11 ]. HIGH TECH. L. 19 1, 193
(2010).
14. See generally Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad
II), 653 F.3d 1329, 1358-73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore,]., concurring in part) (discussing the
chemical and physical differences of laboratory-created DNA molecules versus naturally
occurring DNA molecules), vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
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these artificial molecules should easily be eligible for patent protection as
chemical entities. I 5 The problem, though, is that these molecules' chemical
structure and their informational content are inseparable. Therefore,
granting a patent to the innovators in this field may confer exclusive rights
not just over the chemical structure, but also over the informational
contenp6-all to the detriment of future research in genetics and genetic
diseases. I7
Of course, patent seekers in this area do not seek to patent random
genetic sequences. IS Instead, they seek patent protection on genes that are

Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). The case is commonly referred to as "the Myriad decision," after
the name of the patent holder in question and one of the named defendants. See, e.g.,Joshua D.
Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions Ajter Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HAsTINGS LJ. 53, 55 (2011)
(referring to the decision as "Myriad Genetics"). Myriad I was the district court decision that the
Federal Circuit reversed. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
(Myriad 1),702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 222-32 (S.D.N.V. 2010), affd in part, rev'd in part, 653 F'3d
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). Myriad II was vacated by the Supreme Court on March 26, 2012, and
remanded for reconsideration "in light of Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc., ... 132 S. Ct. 1289 ... (2012)." Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.
(Myriad III), 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) (order granting petition for the writ of certiorari, vacating
the decision below, and remanding for reconsideration). After remand, the same panel of the
Federal Circuit that heard Myriad II, by the same 2-1 vote, reached an identical conclusion as
prior to the remand. Ass'n for Molecnlar Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad
IV), 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012). Becanse the analysis
in Myriad IV did not deviate from Myriad II, and because the opinion (especially Judge Moore's
concurrence) in Myriad II is more scientifically comprehensive, the discussion in this Article will
focus on the latter, rather than the former.
15. See Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1349-55 (applying basic chemistry principles to laboratorycreated DNA molecules and concluding that they are patent eligible); id. at 1358-73 (Moore,
]., concurring in part) (same); id. at 1373-81 (Bryson,]., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (reaching the same result with respect to some, though not all, laboratory-created DNA
molecules).
16. Myriad 1,702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (relying on the DNA's informational nature to conclude
that patent claims on DNA cover the information contained therein and therefore cannot be
sustained under the Patent Act); Debra Greenfield, Intangible or Embodied Information: The NonStatutory Nature oj Human Genetic Material, 25 SA.!"ITA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 467,
475-77 (2009) ("[I]t is arguable that potential plaintiffs will be reluctant to qnestion the
legality of the subject matter of a patent on the informational content of DNA and DNA
sequences.");Janice M. Mueller, Public Access Versus Proprietary Rights in Genomic Injormation: What
Is the Proper Role oj Intellectual Property Rights?, 6]. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'y 222, 229 (2003).
17. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role oj Patents in Appropriating the Value oj
DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY LJ. 783, 796 (2000) ("There are sound policy reasons to be wary of
permitting use of the patent system to capture the value of information itself. The traditional
patent bargain ensures that patenting promptly enriches the information base, even as it slows
down commercial imitation. This balances the interests of inventors in earning a return on past
research investments against the interests of the larger public in promoting future research."
(footnote omitted)).
18. See Donna M. Gitter, Led Astray by the Moral Compass: Incorporating Morality into European
Union Biotechnology Patent Law, 19 BERKELEY]. INT'L L. I, I I n.78 (2001) (noting that NIH
abandoned attempts to patent certain genes when they could not identify their utility); Arti K.
Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role oj Patents and
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either known to produce certain proteins or the expression of which is
found to be associated with a certain medical condition. For instance, a
patent was sought on genes known as BRCAl/BRCA2'9 because these
particular genetic sequences are associated with a higher incidence of breast
cancer.' O The exclusive rights granted by the patent allow the patent-holder
to limit the use and manufacture of these genes in testing or treating the
disease,., and for that matter, in future genetic research about breast cancer
or other disease." The problem for the patentees is that the association
between certain genetic sequences and corresponding conditions is a
product of nature and is not an invention of anyone.2 3 Though the search
for these associations is laborious, expensive, painstaking,.4 and ultimately of
significant importance to science and medicine,'5 the fruits of the search
cannot be made exclusive to any person.2 6 Nor can the genetic sequence, in
and of itself-though it be newly found-be eligible for a patent, for that
sequence is also a product of nature.' 7
On the other hand, once the association between a certain genetic code
and a condition is discovered, scientists can create smaller versions of

Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 813, 840 (2001) (stating that under the PTO's standard, "the
thousands of patent applications that have been filed on DNA sequences (and other genetic or
protein information) of unknown function are likely to be rejected . . . [because) gene
fragments of unknown function are not patentable").
19. See U.s. Patent No. 6,033,857 (filed Mar. 20, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 (filed
Apr. 29, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441 (filed Jan. 5, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed
June 7,1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,710,001 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 (filed
June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7,1995),
20. Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of
Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 737,775 n.186 (2004) ("[Genes) BRCAI and BRCA2 ...
are associated with inherited forms of breast cancer.").
21. See Roger D. Klein & Maurice J. Mahoney, LabCorp v. Metabolite Laboratories: The
Supreme Court Listens, but Declines to Speak, 36].L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 146 (2008).
22.
See id.; Robertson, supra note 13, at 383.
23.
See Lamis G. Eli, Case Note, It'lzen Myriad Genetics Prohibited a Myriad of options:
Association for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 21 DEPAUL]' ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 357,
382 (2011).
24. Andrew W. Torrance, open Source Human Evolution, 30 WASH. U.].L. & POL'y 93, 129
(2009); Stone, supra note 13, at 224 ("[S)equencing DNA is time consuming and expensive .... ").
25. See David Galas, Foreword to OFFICE OF HEALTH & ENVTL. RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, HUMAN GENOME: 1991-92 PROGRAM REpORT, at iv (1992); E. Donald Shapiro,Jennifer
Long & Rebecca Gideon, To Clone or Not to Clone, 4 N.Y.U.]. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'y 23, 28 (2000)
(stating that the results of genetic research "have led to major advances in medicine, such as the
development of insulin and anti-clotting medication").
26. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)
("[M)anifestations of laws of nature [are) free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.");
Eli, supra note 23, at 382-86.
27. Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A
Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REv. 295, 311 (2007); Lauren M. Dunne,
Case Note, "Come, Let Us Return to Reason": Association of Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 20
DEPAULJ.ARTTECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 473, 501 (2010).
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genetic material bearing the same informational content as the naturally
occurring code.'s These molecules, because they are a creation of human
ingenuity, have been held by various patent offices around the globe (and
recently by the courts) to be patent eligible. Nevertheless, patents on these
molecules are subject to another problem. Given the advances in genetics, it
does not take much (if any) creativity to make these molecules once the
association and the native code are known.'9 Once that information is
available, deriving the lab-created molecules is fairly straightforward, if
occasionally laborious and expensive. 30 Patent laws, however, require that a
patent seeker not only establish that the subject matter of his application is
eligible for a patent as a general matter,3 1 but is also sufficiently innovative
("novel" and "non-obvious," in patent terminology) to quality for a patent
once general eligibility has been establishedY
Explorers in this field are thus placed in a lose-lose situation. The true
discoveries (of native code and its association with medical conditions) are
not patent eligible. On the other hand, those genetic discoveries that are
patent eligible (laboratory-created genetic material, for example) are often
not sufficiently innovative to quality for a patent. This inability to obtain
patents because of either the subject matter eligibility bar or the novelty bar
means that the incentive to innovate that is inherent in the patent system is
absent (or at least diminished) in the field of genetics research. And given
the fact that the search for the genes and their associations with specific
diseases is costly and unpredictable, the inability to recoup investments
through exclusive rights discourages investments in this area.
However, even if patents were available for genetic "discoveries" in some
specific instances, such patents present a problem for the public. Since
patents grant exclusive rights to make or use the patented invention,33 one
who holds a patent on a lab-created genetic sequence could prevent other
scientists from making the same sequence in their laboratories to use in

28. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 196-97 (S.D. NY 2010) (discussing various uses for
isolated and purified DNA), aJfd in part, reu'd in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated
sub nom. Myriad III, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
29. See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products
and Invention in the American System, f,o EMORY LJ. 101, 114-15 (2001) (discussing automation
and routinization of DNA sequencing); Stone, supra note 13, at 224 (noting that though
expensive, DNA sequencing is "routine").
30. Timo Minssen, Meanwhile on the Other Side of the Pond: Why Biopharmaceutical Inventions
That Were "Obvious to Try "Still Might Be Non-Obvious-Part 1,9 CHI.-KENTj. INTELL. PROP. 60, 126
(2010) (describing "sequencing and mere identification of genes" as "a routine process, which
normally does not involve any particular difficulties").
31. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
32. Id. §§ 102-103 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Although the distinctions between novelty and
obviousness are important ones, for the sake of brevity I refer to both requirements as the
"novelty" requirement for the remainder of the Article.
33. Id. § 271 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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further experiments. 34 This would be true even if no immediate economic
benefit would accrue to those scientists and even if they were not selling
(and competing) with the patentee. 35 If patents foreclose not just
competitors' economic gains but further scientific exploration, they are
detrimental rather than beneficial to the public.36
This Article proposes a solution to the quandary. Innovation and
research in genetics can be incentivized by providing innovators in this field
with an alternate and more limited form of exclusivity than that bestowed by
patents. Lawmakers can mold such a system on the exclusivity provisions of
the Hatch-Waxman Act37 and the new Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act.3 8 Under these Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
administered exclusivity regimes, no generic manufacturer can market a
drug or biologic product similar to a protected one, whether or not the
protected product is covered by a valid U.S. Patent. Unlike a patent, which
grants exclusive rights to make, use, or sell, these types of statutory exclusivity
provisions are limited to restrictions on competitors' marketing. In contrast,
one need not satisfy the strict novelty requirements of the Patent Act in
order to take advantage of the FDA exclusivity regime. These distinctions
between patent protection and marketing exclusivity make the latter ideally
suited to promoting research and innovation in genetics.
Under the proposed regime, parties who spend time, money, and
energy looking for correlations between certain genetic sequences and
medical conditions would be able to apply for market exclusivity for the tests
and treatments they designed. As the sole providers of tests or treatments
(or both), they would be able to recoup their investment and make a profit,
even if their tests and treatments would not qualify for patent protection.
Furthermore, by limiting the scope of exclusive rights only to the sale of tests
or treatments, other researchers would not be constrained in making or
using copies of the protected molecules for research purposes. In this way,
the proposed marketing exclusivity regime reserves the chemical structure
of the laboratory-created molecules for the innovator's exclusive commercial

34. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
("[T]ests, demonstrations, and experiments which are in keeping with the legitimate business
of the alleged infringer are infringements for which experimental use is not a defense."
(internal alterations omitted) (quoting Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1125-26 (U.S.
Ct. Cl. 1977» (internal quotation marks omitted», superseded by statute in part, Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(codified in relevant part at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011 ».
35. [d. at 861 (" [T] he patentee does not need to have any evidence of damage or lost sales
to bring an infringement action.").
36. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
37. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417,98 Stat. 1585.
38. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002, 124 Stat.
804, 119 (2010) (codified as amended aq2 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2006 & Supp. V 2011».
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exploitation (for a limited time), while leaving the information-carrying
function of the gene for the public domain.
This Article begins in Part II by explaining the basics of molecular
genetics. This primer is important in order to understand what it is that
patents on genetic materials claim to be a protected invention. This Part will
discuss the structure of genes, DNA, and the cellular mechanisms that
control DNA's expression and functions. It will then explain the differences
between naturally occurring and laboratory-made DNA molecules.
Part III lays out the architecture of patent law and applies it to the
specific case of nucleic acids. It discusses the principles, history, and
philosophical underpinnings of the patent system and why some kinds of
matter are considered to be patent eligible while others are not. It also
addresses the novelty requirements for a patent once the eligibility bar has
been cleared. Part IV applies the principles from the preceding Part to
argue that laboratory-created DNA molecules should be eligible for patent
protection under current law. Part V demonstrates that, though isolated
genes may be eligible for patent protection, they are ultimately not entitled
to a patent for failure of the novelty requirements of the Patent Act.
Parts VI and VII detail this Article's proposal for a market exclusivity
regime. Part VI discusses the current powers of the FDA to regulate drugs,
biologics, and medical devices, as well as various statutory exclusivity
provisions associated with these regulations. Part VII proposes expanding
these provisions to cover novel genetic tests and treatments. This FDA-based
protection would be in lieu of the protection offered by the patent system
and would allow researchers whose patent applications might be rejected or
invalidated on novelty grounds to obtain a return on their investment in
developing new diagnostic and therapeutic modalities. Such a regime would
provide proper incentives for the pioneers in the field of molecular genetics
without limiting access to the newly discovered genes for purposes of further
research.
The Article's concluding observations are offered in Part VIII.
II.

THE SCIENCE AND USES OF GENE ISOlATION AND SEQUENCING

In the discussion of whether genes ought or ought not be patentable,
the question of what innovators are seeking to patent is often lost. Instead,
debates often degenerate into the somewhat strange discussion of whether a
human being is patent eligible. 39 Such broadsides at the idea of patenting
genes overlook the distinctions between naturally occurring DNA present in
39. See Lauren M. Nowierski, Note, A Defense of Patenting Human Gene Sequences Under U.S.
Law: Supportfor the Patenting of Isolated and Purified Substances, 26 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. LJ. 473,
505 (2008) (stating that patents on DNA "prompt[] the following question[]: ... would a
patent on a gene sequence confer ownership over a human being?"); if. Ann Bartow, Our Data,
Ourselves: Privacy, Propertization, and Gender, 34 U.S.F. L. REv. 633, 690 (2000) (describing
attempts by a British woman to patent herself).
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living human cells and the isolated and purified DNA synthesized in
laboratories. Not only is synthesized DNA man-made, but it is structurally
different from naturally occurring DNA.4 At the same time, despite being
chemically different, the man-made DNA codes for the same proteins as
naturally occurring DNA.41 Understanding these distinctions is crucial to
understanding the legal implications of gene patents.
0

A.

DNAINTHENATIVESTATE

The chemistry of a DNA molecule is surprisingly simple. A DNA
molecule consists of two strands, each of which is simply "a long unbranched
paired polymer chain[], formed always of the same four types of
[subunits] ."42 The subunits contain bases known as adenine, cytosine,
guanine, and thymine ("A," "C," "G," and "T," respectively) .43 Each of these
bases is attached to the repetitive sugar-phosphate chain "analogous to a
necklace ... strung with four types ofbeads."44 The sugar unit in the DNA is
called deoxyribose. 45 Each adenine base on one strand is paired to the
thymine base on the other, and each cytosine base strand is paired to a
guanine. 46 Thus, each strand of the DNA is "complementary" to the other.47
The DNA molecule can be visualized as a zipper with each strand forming a
backbone of the zipper and the A, C, T, G base pairs forming the "teeth."4 8
Unlike a regular zipper, though, a molecule of DNA is neither straight nor
flat.49 Instead, in its native state the DNA molecule "is twisted in a spiral
ladder shape."5 0 Each strand forms a continuous helix giving rise to a
"double-helix" model of the entire structure.5'
The DNA double helix is but the beginning of the story of native DNA's
physical structure. Each DNA molecule is packaged in a separate
chromosome,5 2 and all of an organism's chromosomes taken together carry

40. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
41. See Myriad I. 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 222-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), affd in part, rev'd in part,
653 F·3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. MyriadIlI, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
42. BRUCEALBERTSET AL., MOLECUlAR BIOLOGY OFTHE CELL 2 (5th ed. 2008).
43. Id. at 2-3.
44. Id. atI 97·
45. Id.
46. Id. at 197-98.
47· Id. atI 99·
48. Ryan McDonald, Note, Juries and Crime Labs: Correcting the Weak Links in the DNA Chain,
24 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 348 (1998); see also ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 198 (illustrating
DNA's structure schematically).
49. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 199 (modeling and illustrating DNA's threedimensional structure).
50. Melissa Kidder, Comment, Human DNA v. Non-Human DNA: A Look at the General
Admissibility oJNon-HumanDNA in the Courts, 35 OHIO N.V. L. REv. 397, 398 (2009).
51. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 197-98.
52. Id. at 202.
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the entirety of that organism's genetic information-the organism's
genome. 53 The DNA is associated with chromosomal proteins (such as
histones)54 that pack the DNA molecule in an orderly way55 and regulate
gene expression.56 Each chromosome then is not just a long, "twisted
ladder" model consisting solely of a DNA molecule, but a much more
complex structure where the DNA is coiled and packed in complex threedimensional structures.
Each chromosome contains numerous genes. 57 The human genome
contains upwards of 20,000 genes58 that all have to fit on only twenty-three
pairs of chromosomes. Each chromosome, therefore, contains hundreds or
thousands of genes. 59 Although each cell contains its organism's entire
genome, not all genes are expressed or "turned on" at all times. 60 This is
rather self-evident. If all genes were turned on in all cells all of the time, cell
differentiation would be impossible. 61 In other words, cells would not be
able to differentially develop into liver cells, brain cells, blood cells, skin
cells, etc. 62 That they actually do so is the result of certain genes being
expressed in certain cells but not in others. 63 In order to allow for such
differential gene expression, cells identiry which genes to express through
various cellular mechanisms, like chemical modification of the DNA
molecule64 or protein binding to relevant segments of DNA in order to turn
them "on" or "off."6s

53. Id. at 7-8.
54. Id. at 211.
55. See id.
56. Rajesh C. Rao, Alternatives to Embryonic Stem Cells and Cloning: A Brief Scientific Overview,
9 YALE]. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 603, 605 (2009) ("Gene expression is regulated by
chemical modifications to DNA and DNA-associated proteins called his tones, which are
proteins around which DNA is 'wrapped. "').
57. A gene is a unit of DNA that produces a single functional RNA molecule. ALBERTS ET
AL., supra note 42, at 204. RNA, in turn, codes for proteins and other materials necessary for
operation of the cell. See id. at 5-7.
58. Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in Medicine,
39 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 391, 410 (2004) ("Human beings, by current estimates, have
between 26,000 and 40,000 separate genes, spread across twenty-three chromosomes . . . ."
(footnote omitted)).
59. Mary Breen Smith, An End to Gene Patents? The Human Genome Project Ver.sus the United
States Patent and Trademark Office'S 1999 Utility Guidelines, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 747, 752 (2002).
60. SeeALBERTSET AL., supra note 42, at 432.
61. See id. at 411-12.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Katharine A. Van Tassel, Genetically Modified Plants Used for Food, Risk Assessment and
Uncertainty Principles: Does the Transition from Ignorance to Indeterminacy Trigger the Need for PostMarket Surveillance?, 15 B.U.]. SCI. & TECH. L. 220, 236-37 (2009). Methylation is a "chemical
modification of cytosine, one of the four chemical subunits of DNA. Without proper DNA
methylation, higher organisms from plants to humans have a host of developmental problems,
from dwarfing in plants to certain death in mice." Does Environment Influence Genes? Researcher

14 10

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98: 1399

As complex as the DNA structure is, DNA itself serves no active
function 66 other than providing a set of genetic instructions for the
production of other molecules important in cellular function-proteins.67
Proteins are made up of subunits called amino acids, of which there are
twenty.68 Each amino acid is coded for by DNA.6g Since DNA is a linear
polymer of four different nucleotides, one needs a sufficient combination of
nucleotides to code for each amino acid. Mathematically, the smallest
number of nucleotides needed to code for twenty amino acids, when
selected from a total group of four nucleotides, is three.7° Thus, each
sequence of three nucleotides (also known as a "codon")7 1 codes for a
distinct amino acid.72 At first blush then, a gene could be described as a
linear series of codons each coding for an amino acid of a resultant
protein.7 3 That description, however, would only be partially true. For
reasons not wholly understood,74 genes have non-coding regions (known as
"introns")75 interspersed between coding regions (known as "exons").7 6

Gives Hard Tlwughts on Soft Inheritance, SCIENCEDAILY (Aug. 8, 2006), http://www.sciencedaily.coml
releases/ 2006/ 081 060807154 715.htm.
65. See Rao, supra note 56, at 605.
66. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 4 (describing DNA as "information·bearing").
67. See id.; Van Tassel, supra note 64, at 231 ("[AJ gene provides the complete set of
instructions on how to build a particular protein .... ").
68. Arti K. Rai, InteUectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 832 (1999).
69. John Murray, Note, Owning Genes: Disputes Involving DNA Sequence Patents, 75 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 231, 246 n.110 (1999) (citing ROBERT SCHLEIF, GENETICS AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
188-g0 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1993) (1986».
70. Mathematically, four letters each of which used alone would result in just four
permutations. If four letters were used two at a time, sixteen permutations are possible. Only if
four letters are used three at a time will the number of permutations (sixty-four) exceed twenty.
71. Eli A. Loots, Note, The 200I USPTO Written Description Guidelines and Gene Claims, 17
BERKELEYTECH.LJ-117, 120n.23 (2002).
72. Id. Three codons are "stop codons," i.e., instead of coding for an amino acid they send
a signal that the protein chain is to terminate at that point. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at
367 fig.6-50 (table of codons). However, because three codons taken from a set of four create
sixty-four different coding permutations (i.e., significantly more than the twenty necessary
ones), the code is said to be degenerate as more than one permutation can code for the same
amino acid. Id.; Loots, supra note 71, at 120 n.23. For example, codons CGT, CGC, CGA, CGG,
AGA, and AGG all code for the same amino acid-arginine. At the same time, only a single
codon (ATG) codes for amino acid methionine. ALBERTS ET AL, supra note 42, at 367 fig.6-50
(table of codons).
73. In fact, that is precisely the structure of bacterial DNA. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note
4 2 , at 347.
74. ANTHONY J.F. GRIFFITHS ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC ANALYSIS 8 (7th ed.
2000).
75. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 206.
76. Id.
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Indeed, the majority of the genetic material, contrary to intuition, consists of
the non-coding regions. 77
A mutation in the codon sequence, whether by an inappropriate
addition or deletion of a nucleotide or by changing one nucleotide to
another, often results in coding for an incorrect amino acid,78 which may
result in the protein being defective79 or completely nonfunctiona1. 80 Thus,
when diagnosing genetic disorders, it is important to know both the normal
sequence and the mutations so that either can be identified. 8•
As mentioned previously, the two DNA strands are complementary to
each other,82 but they are not exact mirror images of each other. Thus if one
strand, for example, has the sequence AAA, the complementary strand
would have a sequence TIT.83 Since each DNA sequence codes for a specific
amino acid, it matters which strand is the "coding" strand, known as the
"sense" strand, and which one is the "non-coding" strand, known as the
"anti-sense" strand. 84 Identifying which strand is the "sense" strand for a
particular protein is difficult because both strands can have both "sense" and
"anti-sense" regions. 8s Cellular mechanisms have developed to differentiate
between the two when the genetic code is converted into the final product,86
but until such conversion happens, it is impossible to tell which strand at a
given location is which. 87

77. Id.
78. Brian C. Cannon, Note, Toward a Clear Standard of Obviousness for Biotechnology Patents,
79 CORNELL L. REv. 735, 738 (1994) ("Genetic diseases arise from mutations in the code
sequence of DNA. This gives rise to dysfunctional proteins .... [TJhe mutation of just one base
in a gene sequence can have disastrous consequences for the protein .... This results in the
insertion of a wrong amino acid into the protein." (footnote omitted)).
79. See, e.g., ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 17;Janet Brewer, "Diseases of Place": Legal and
Ethical Implications of Surname and Ethnicity as Predictors of Disease Risk, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH LJ.
155, 157 (2006) (noting that a single amino acid change in a ~ unit of hemoglobin causes the
protein not to function normally and is responsible for sickle cell anemia).
80. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 558.
8!. Cf Dunne, supra note 27, at 479-80 (discussing how scientists diagnose genetic
disease by linking mutations to specific conditions).
82. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
84. Matthew D. Kellam, Note, Making Sense Out of Antisense: The Enablement Requirement in
Biotechnology AfterEnzo Biochem v. Calgene, 76 IND. LJ. 221, 233 (2001).
85. Sandra Schmieder, Scope of Biotechnology Inventions in the United States and in EuropeCompulsory Licensing, Experimental Use and Arbitration: A Study of Patentability of DNA-Related
Inventions with Special Emphasis on the Establishment of an Arbitration Based Compulsory Licensing
System, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 163, 172 n.30 (2004) ("Genomic (or
chromosomal) DNA is double-stranded and consists of interspersed coding and non-coding
regions on both strands.").
86. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 343 (discussing gene promoters and gene
regulatory proteins).
87. CJ id. (stating that neighboring genes can be located on opposing strands, and that
many regulatory aspects of RNA synthesis have not been well defined).
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It is from these complex chromosomal structures-portions of which
are chemically modified in order to render them temporarily inactive,
portions of which are tightly bound with complex proteins, portions of
which are written upside down, and portions of which do not seem to serve
any particular function at all-that proteins are made. It is that process to
which I now turn.
B.

FROM DNA TO RNA AND TO PROTEINS

As alluded to above, the DNA is just an instruction manual for the
creation of the ultimate cellular product-the protein. 88 It is a rather
complex manual, wrapped in a hard-ta-break wrapper, with various pages
being inaccessible, and interspersed with completely irrelevant and
seemingly nonsensical information. 89 Yet somehow the cell follows this
manual in two major steps: transcription and translation.9 0
In the first step the DNA is "transcribed" into an RNA molecule. This
molecule is an exact replica of the DNA's own coding strand,9 1 but for two
exceptions. In the RNA molecule, thymine nucleotides are replaced with
uracil ("U") nucleotides.9 2 Additionally, the "backbone" of the RNA
molecule is somewhat different from that of the DNA. The sugar molecule
in RNA is ribose,93 whereas in DNA it is deoxyribose. 94
The initial RNA molecule has eliminated some of the "difficulties" of
the DNA. The RNA's nucleotides are not chemically modified,95 it has only
the sense strand rather than both the sense and anti-sense strands,96 it
contains only a single gene 97 rather than hundreds of genes found on any
given chromosome, and it does not have histones bound to it.98
Though the RNA is rid of some of the DNA's chemical alterations, it has
some new ones of its own. On one end of the RNA strand a special
methylated guanine nucleotide is added which is known as a "5' cap."99 On
the other end, once the DNA to RNA copying is finished, a long tail

See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
90. Stephen H. Schilling, Note, DNA as Patentable Subject Matter and a Narrow Framework for
Addressing the Perceived Problems Caused by Gene Patents, 61 DUKE LJ. 731,734 (2011).
91. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 332-33 (noting that the non-template strand's
88.
89.

sequence corresponds to the synthesized RNA's sequence).
92. Id. at 332.
93. Id.
94· Id. at 197·
95. See Van Tassel, supra note 64, at 236 n.l06 (describing cytosine methylation as
occurring in DNA).
96. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 333 (noting that RNA is a single-strand molecule
and carries infonnation for a single gene).
97.

See id.

98.

Histone, by definition, is a DNA-binding protein. Id. at 211.
Id. at 346.

99.

201 3]
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consisting of 100 to 200 adenine nucleotides and known as a "poly-A tail" is
added.lO o These structures, though they do not code for amino acids,
promote the RNA's stability and permit cellular mechanisms to verify that
the strand is intact before beginning the process of producing proteins
based on the RNA's code. 101
Additionally, at this stage the RNA still contains both introns and
exons. I02 If that was where the process stopped, the cellular mechanism
would read non-coding regions, thus creating proteins with an incorrect
structure. 103 Therefore, the RNA molecule is modified further through a
process known as RNA splicing. Only once the RNA is properly spliced is it
ready to be translated into a protein structure. I04 The spliced and modified
RNA is known as messenger RNA, or mRNA.'o5 With a majority of the
genetic code spliced out back in the nucleus, the addition of the 5' cap and
a poly-A tail, the substitution of uracil for thymine, and a different sugar
entity forming its "backbone," the mRNA is a fundamentally different
molecule from the DNA that formed the original template for the mRNA's
production.
C. DISCOVERING AND USING GENES

Though the actual molecule that serves as a template for protein
synthesis is mRNA, scientists often have to work with DNA when they study
genes. Since mRNA is produced only after the gene is turned on for
transcription and translation, the mRNA is present only immediately before
and during protein production. 106 In contrast, cellular DNA is always present
and contains the code for all genes.'o7 True, many of those genes are turned
off, all have fairly randomly interspersed non-coding regions, and are
otherwise difficult to access and assess; but nonetheless, because every cell in
the organism contains that organism's entire genome,108 the DNA from any
cell could in theory be used to find any gene of interest. To illustrate why
working with DNA is necessary, consider a situation of a person who has a
gene that codes for cancer. The gene may not yet be active and may not
become active for several years. Since the gene is not presently active, it is
not being used to produce proteins, so no mRNA is produced. However, the
gene is present on the DNA molecule and will make itself known later. To
the extent that one wishes to diagnose the unfortunate individual before the
100.
101.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Seeid.at347·
See id. at 335-36 (describing how mRNA is "read" by the cellular mechanism).
See id. at 347-48.
!d. at 345·
See id. at 399 fig. 6-g 7 .
See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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onset of cancer, one must find a way to identify the gene on the DNA strand
while it is quiescent. Thus, the ultimate target of genetic research is the
molecule that carries all of the organism's genetic information-the DNA
molecule.
In order to locate and identify the quiescent gene on a complex DNA
molecule packed with thousands of other genes, scientists create a "probe"
molecule designed to bind to the region of interest and alert the scientists to
the targeted gene's location. 109 Such a probe is manufactured utilizing wellknown processes in which scientists can "reverse transcribe" a strand of
mRNA and create a DNA string that would be an identical copy of an in vivo
anti-sense DNA strand's coding regions. I 10 This newly created DNA strand is
referred to as complementary DNA or cDNA (because it is complementary
to the mRNA strand that was used as a template).'" The cDNA is a
completely man-made molecule and does not duplicate anything that exists
in nature. 112 It differs from the mRNA molecule in at least three ways. First,
since the mRNA is used as a template, the cDNA is complementary to the
mRNA rather than a copy of it."3 Second, since it is a DNA molecule, it
again uses thymine nucleotides rather than uracil."4 Third, as described
above, the sugar backbones of the RNA and DNA strands differ. I 15 Nor is the
cDNA strand identical to the in vivo DNA. First, it is missing introns." 6
Second, since the cDNA is a laboratory-produced molecule, it is not
subjected to cellular regulation. Third, because cDNA is just a transcript of a
single gene, it is not part of a larger structure such as a chromosome with
additional nucleotides (and genes) on either end of the gene of interest.
Finally, because cDNA is complementary to the mRNA, it has a region
complementary to the poly-A tail-a region not present in the in vivo
DNA."7 Nothing about cDNA then is "naturally occurring." Rather, it is a
completely artificial construct, though a useful one for studying naturally
occurring DNA.

See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 535-37.
ld.
Ill.
Myriadl, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), affdinpart, rcv'dinpart, 653 F.3d
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Myriad IlL 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012); ALBERTS ET AL., supra
note 42, at 535-37.
112.
See Michael D. Davis, The Patenting of Products of Nature, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. LJ. 293, 3 15 (1995)·
113.
See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 543 (discussing and illustrating the reverse
transcription process); Douglas L. Rogers, Coding for Life-Should Any Entity Have the Exclusive
Right to Use and Selllsolated DNA?, PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL'y, Fall 20 I I , at I, 66--67.
114. Rogers, supra note 113, at 66-67.
I 15.
See supra notes 93--94 and accompanying text.
116. Since the cDNA is complementary to the mRNA, and since mRNA is a genetic
molecule from which introns have been spliced out, the cDNA does not have introns either.
117. A region complementary to the 5' cap is also initially present, but is usually cleaved off
when the molecule is further processed in the laboratory.
109.

110.
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Once a cDNA molecule is constructed, it can be used as a probe to
identify genes in vivo. While the cDNA strand as a whole is not
complementary to any in vivo DNA sequence because cDNA lacks introns, •• s
there is a sufficient amount of overlap to allow the cDNA to attach itself (or
to "hybridize") with the native DNA."9 Once the cDNA hybridizes with
native DNA, the entire sequence of the native genes (including introns) can
be identified by looking at the various points of hybridizations and finding
the endpoints of each gene.'20 Then the entire gene of interest can be
excised with the help of specific and well-known enzymes,·2. and its entire
sequence can be discovered through well-known (and mostly automated)
methods .• 22
The genetic sequence, once discovered, presents multiple opportunities
for scientific advances. Researchers can construct probes to test for a
mutated native DNA strand· 23 and diagnose predisposition to cancer and
other diseases.'24 They can also inject laboratory-created cDNA into bacteria,
causing the modified bacteria to express proteins coded for by the injected
sequence.'25 In one example, a DNA sequence coding for the human
hormone insulin was injected into bacteria, which then caused the bacteria's
own cellular mechanism to express the new gene and produce the hormone
it had not previously produced. 126 The protein thus produced could be used
for the purposes of further research,127 as well as treatment of human
diseases caused by the deficiency of that protein (which, in the case of
insulin, would be diabetes).
Isolated genes as a whole are also useful for both research and
treatment. Though isolated "full" genes' 28 contain non-coding regions, they
are more useful in certain experiments. For instance, full genes are better
suited for transgenic animals (i.e., animals with a foreign gene inserted into
their native genome) studies because they somehow increase the odds that

1 18. Recall that cDNA is synthesized from mRNA from which introns have been excised. See
supra note 116.
119. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 537.
120.
Id. at 314.
121. Anne Lawton, The Frankenstein Controversy: The Constitutionality of a Federal Ban on
Cloning, 87 KY. LJ. 277, 285 (1999)·
122. Golden, supra note 29, at 114-15.
123.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
124.
See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), affd in part, rev'd in part, 653
F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Myriad III, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
125. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 544.
126. Jake]. Allen, Note, Conducting Embryonic Stem Cell Research on Native Lands in Michigan,
11 MICH. ST. V.]. MED. &L. 395,403 n.39 (2007).
127. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 544.
128. By "full" I mean code with introns present.
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the inserted gene will remain stable and be transcribed into the host
animal's RNA. 12 9
Furthermore, full genes (and occasionally cDNA) can be used in
treatment of certain diseases, though such interventions are currently in
their infancy and are experimental,, 30 Laboratory-created "normal" genes
can be inserted into the subject in order to counteract any genetic
abnormality, thus treating the disease caused by the abnormal in vivo
genes.'3
Finally, as one might expect, the knowledge of the genetic sequence of
one gene helps advance research into other genes and biological processes.
All too often, diseases and other characteristics are controlled not by a single
gene but by a combination of genes working together" 32 In these situations,
the expression of some genes is directly affected by expression of others"33
Given the complex nature of genetic expression, scientists need to work with
already discovered and described genes in order to continue their
exploration. '34
1

D.

SUMMARY

As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, genetic research is a
complex endeavor that involves molecular manipulation, creation of new
129. Ralph L. Brinster et ai., Introns Increase Transcriptional Efficiency in Transgenic Mice, 85
PROC. NAT'LACAD. SCI. U.S. 836, 836-40 (1988).
130. Steven M. Silverberg, Note, Safe at Home? Assessing U.S. Efforts to Protect Youths from the
Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sports, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 271, 307 (2010); Gene
Therapy, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/therapy?show=all (last
updated Feb. 18,2013).
131. Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 85 TuL. L. REv. 323, 374
(2010); see also ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 566-69 (describing the process of creating
transgenic mice and other organisms); Gerard Magill, The Ethics Weave in Human Genomics,
Embryonic Stem Cell Research, and Therapeutic Cloning: Promoting and Protecting Society's Interests, 65
ALB. L. REv. 701, 716 (2002).
132. See, e.g., Michael Tomasson, Legal, Ethical, and Conceptual Bottlenecks to the Development of
Useful Genomic Tests, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 231, 236 (2009); Courtney C. Scala, Note, Making
the Jump from Gene Pools to Patent Pools: How Patent Pools Can Facilitate the Development of
Pharmacogenomics,41 CONN. L. REv. 1631, 1661 n.167 (2009).
133. See Jonathan Kaplan, Misinformation, Misrepresentation, and Misuse of Human Behavioral
Genetics Research, 69 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 50 (2006); Wolf Reik, Stability and Flexibility of
Epigenetic Gene Regulation in Mammalian Development, 447 NATURE 425, 425 (2007). This should
not be surprising as, for example, some genes code for proteins that then themselves bind to
other parts of the DNA and either facilitate or inhibit downstream gene expression. See Scott
Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living Constitution, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1319, 1337-38 (2008)
(discussing the histone H4 gene); Rao, supra note 56, at 605; supra notes 56 and 65 and
accompanying text (discussing the influence of binding proteins on gene expression). If the
upstream gene undergoes mutations, then the expression of downstream genes would be
affected.
134. See, e.g., Myriad 1,702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (describing the work of
one of the plaintiffs, Dr. Harry Ostrer), ajJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2011), vacated sub nom. Myriad III, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
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molecules unknown in nature, and even combining various pieces of DNA
from unrelated organisms in order to produce the desired product. These
manipulations are complex, involve the breaking of old and the creation of
new chemical bonds, and require a significant amount of effort and skill.
Viewed from a purely chemical and structural perspective, there is little
doubt that molecules such as cDNA or pieces of "full" DNA isolated,
purified, and extracted from a chromosome are radically different from
what 'one could find in nature. However, viewed from a content- and
information-based perspective, laboratory-created DNA molecules are
identical to their naturally occurring chromosomal counterparts. Because
DNA, whether naturally occurring or lab-created, codes for the same
ultimate product of interest, its functionality and basic use is not altered by
human intervention.
As a matter of scientific principle, both views are sound. However, the
two viewpoints have very different implications for the question of whether a
genetic innovation is patent eligible.

III.
A.

THE PRINCIPLES, PRECEDENTS, AND PURPOSES OF PATENT LAw

THE BASIC DICHOTOMY BETWEEN DISCOVERY AND INVENTION IN AMERICAN
PATENT LAw

The U.S. Constitution, recognizing the need to "promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts," bestows upon Congress the authority to grant
"exclusive Right[s]" to inventors for their discoveries.'35 Congress has taken
advantage of this grant of power throughout the nation's history by passing
various Patent Acts beginning as early as 1790.'36 Although both technology
and the law changed and evolved from the late eighteenth century to the
mid-twentieth century when Congress adopted the 1952 Patent Act l 37
(currently in effect as amended) ,13 8 at least one basic consideration of what
is patent eligible l39 remained fairly constant. For instance, the 1790 Act
provided that a patent shall issue to anyone who has "invented or discovered
any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any

135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8.
136. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, I Stat. 109 (current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006)).
137. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 1-376).
138. Rebecca Greendyke, Comment, No Patent for You!: How KSR v. Teleflex 's Nonobviousness
Test Conflicts with the Scientific Method and Removes the Incentive to Innovate, 35 U. DATION L. REv.
413,420 (2010) ("The Patent Act of 1952 is the current patent statute.").
139. I shall use the term "patent eligible" to refer to inventions that could obtain a patent if
they satisfY other requirements such as novelty, non-ob\~ousness, etc. I reserve the term
"patentable" (which is often used to mean "patent eligible," thus creating confusion) for
description of inventions that are both patent eligible and are found to satis£), all additional
requirements. Thus, an invention can be patent eligible but not patentable.
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improvement therein not before known or used."'4 0 The criteria remain
basically unchanged,'4 1 and the current Act requires an issuance of a patent
to whoever "invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof."'4 2
As the legislative language shows, Congress has always been generous
about the potential scope of patent eligibility.'43 In fact, Thomas Jefferson,
who was (through his position as Secretary of State) the first de facto
administrator of the Patent Office ' 44 and the author of the 1793 Patent
Act,'45 wrote that "ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement."'4 6
This liberal approach persisted and was readopted in the 1952 Act. '47 The
principal drafter of that Act testified that "anything under the sun that is
made by man" is included within the scope of patent-eligible subject
matter. 1 48 The committee reports accompanying the Act expressed the same
view. ' 49 This broad view that almost all things are patent eligible has found

140. Patent Act of 1790 § I (emphasis added).
141. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 977-78 (Fed. CiT. 2008) (Newman,]., dissenting), affd,
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
142. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added). The application is, of course, "subject to
[all other 1 conditions and requirements of' the Patent Act. Id.
143. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 977 ("From the first United States patent act in 1790, the
subject matter of the 'useful arts' has been stated broadly, lest advance restraints inhibit the
unknown future.").
144· Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,7 (1966) ("Thomas Jefferson, who as Secretary
of State was a member of the group [of Commissioners for the Promotion of Useful Arts], was
its moving spirit and might well be called the 'first administrator of our patent system."'); Keith
Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion,
Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 717, 746 n.lOl (2007).
145· Graham, 383 U.S. at 7.
146. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans (May 2, 1807), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 74, 76 (H.A. Washington ed., 1853). Jefferson expressed this view despite
being generally opposed to monopolies. Graham, 383 U.S. at 7-8. Indeed, Jefferson was initially
opposed to patents, but later came to view them as beneficial iflimited in time. Id.
147. See In re Bilski, 545 F'3d at 978.
148. Patent Law Codification and Revisions: Hearings on H.R 3760 Before Subcomm. NO.3 of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Congo 37 (1951) (statement of P J. Federico, Examiner in Chief,
U.S. Patent Office), cited in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 & n.6 (1980).
149. See S. REp. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REp. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). There has
been some debate about the true meaning of the phrase which in full reads: "A person may
have 'invented' a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is
made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the
title are fulfilled." S. REp. No. 82-1979, at 5; H.R. REp. No. 82-1923, at 6. In his concurrence in
In re Bilski, Judge Dyk took the position that read in context, the phrase actually excludes
certain man-made inventions from eligibility for patents. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 976 (Dyk,].,
concurring); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3248 (2010) (Stevens,]., concurring in
the judgment); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1000, 1011 (Mayer,]., dissenting) (styling his opinion as
a "dissent," even though he actually agreed with the majority's judgment, but feeling that the
majority did not go far enough). But see Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 ("Congress intended
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favorable reception in the courts going back to at least the middle of the
nineteenth century.I5 Thus, in O'Reilly v. Morse, the Supreme Court opined
that it makes no difference whether the invention "is produced by chemical
agency or combination; or by the application of discoveries or principles in
natural philosophy known or unknown before his invention; or by
machinery acting altogether upon mechanical principles,"I5 I so long as the
discovery is new and is described "in a manner so full and exact, that any
one skilled in the science to which it appertains, can, by using the means he
specifies, without any addition to, or subtraction from them, produce
precisely the result he describes."15 2 Throughout the twentieth century, the
courts have generally adhered to this understanding of the breadth of
patent-eligible subject matter. In the seminal Diamond v. Chakrabarty
opinion, the Supreme Court stated that when an invention in question
(whatever that invention happens to be) "is not nature's handiwork, but
[the inventor's] own ... it is patentable [i.e., patent-eligible] subject matter
under § 101."153
Despite § 101 's breadth and the judicial opinions reaffirming that
Congress intended it to be "merely a coarse filter,"154 it has long been
established that § 101 is not without limits. 15s Since at least 1852,'56 the
courts have held that "[t]he laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas" are not patent eligible.'57 Thus, though the Constitution
speaks of exclusive rights for "[d]iscoveries,"15 8 and the Patent Act declares
both "invent[ions]" and "discover[ies]" to be patent eligible,'59 the courts
0

statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man.'" (quoting S.
REp. No. 82-1979, at 5 and H.R. REp. No. 82-1923, at 6)).
150. See Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY TECH. LJ.
855, 859 (2007) (noting that by mid-nineteenth century courts began to uphold patents on
methods, whereas prior to that "it was unclear whether processes were [patent eligible] to the
extent they read on embodiments not disclosed within the patent description").
151. O'Reillyv. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62,119 (1854).
152. Id.; see also Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. I, I I (1931); Shell Dev.
Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279,283 (D.D.C. 1957).
153· Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.
154. John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEx. L. REv. 1041,
1059 (2011) (quoting Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process
Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922, 43,926 Ouly 27, 2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
155. See, e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
156. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174-75 (1853) ("It is admitted, that a
principle is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original
cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new power, should one be discovered in addition to
those already known .... The same may be said of electricity, and of any other power in nature,
which is alike open to all, and may be applied to useful purposes by the use of machinery.").
157.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citing Le Ruy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175)'
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8.
159. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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have consistently construed that language to differentiate between patenteligible inventions and non-patent-eligible discoveries. According to the
Supreme Court, in order to become a patent-eligible "invention," the nonpatent-eligible "discovery ... must come from the application of the law of
nature to a new and useful end."160 In other words, only that which is "made
by man" is patent eligible. And "[t]o be 'made by man,' something must not
be pre-existing in nature; it must be, literally, an invention."16l It follows,
then, that a naturally occurring phenomenon, whether a physical entity such
as a mineral or a scientific principle or formula, is not patent eligible. 162
This dividing line, though not explicit in either the constitutional or
statutory text, is not arbitrary but rather stems directly from the underlying
purposes of patent law. Scholars have advanced various philosophical and
economic theories of why patent law should exist in the first place. Though
these theories differ, they all in one way or another support the denial of
exclusive rights for mere discoveries. The next Subpart briefly sketches out
the chief arguments for the availability of patent protection because these
arguments shed light on both empirical and normative claims that I will
make later in the Article.
B.

TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICA TIONS FOR PATENT PROTECTION

On the most basic level, arguments in favor of exclusive patent rights
are the same, or at least very similar to, the arguments for property rights
generally.16 3 These arguments can be roughly divided into two subsets:
economic justifications l64 and moral justifications. 165
The utilitarian argument for patents is fairly straightforward and (as
with most utilitarian arguments) reduces to an economic cost-benefit

160. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
161. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn,j., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
162. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
163. I. Trotter Hardy, Not So Different: Tangible, Intangible, Digital, and Analog Works and Their
Comparison for CffJryright Purposes, 26 U. DAYrON L. REv. 211, 221 (2001) ("UJustification for
intellectual property laws is much the same as that for tangible real property laws."); Joel Sage,
Note, Revenue Streams and Safe Harbors: How Water Law Suggests a Solution to CffJryright's orphan
Works Problem, 16 B.U. j. SCI. & TECH. L. 294, 301 (2010) ("In order to understand the
theoretical underpinnings of intellectual property law, it is helpful to first review the basis of
property law generally.").
164. William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1659, 1688
(1988) ("The utilitarian theory ... is undoubtedly the most venerable and oft-recited of the
justifications for the American law of intellectual property.").
165. See Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping
Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1473, 1478 (2004) (,Justifications for
protecting intellectual property abound: regulation of creative and inventive works may be
based upon ... natural rights, or personhood arguments." (footnote omitted)).
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analysis. 166 On one side of the scales is "the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,"16i and on the other side are the limitations on competition l68 and
availability of whatever products and processes are subject to the patent's
monopoly power. 16g The problem, of course, is that exclusive rights that
patents entail are not an unalloyed good.
On one hand, they may spur some innovation by serving as an
economic incentive and reward to innovators. 17° In other words, people will
innovate more if the reward for such innovation is higher. 171 Additionally,
patents are a quid pro quo transaction in which the inventor obtains
exclusive rights in exchange for disclosing his invention to the public. 17 '
Thus, patents build on the common wealth of mankind because they
increase "the public stock of knowledge,"173 allowing it to avoid having to
reinvent the wheel every time. 174
On the other hand, because patents grant exclusive rights to make, sell,
and use inventions,17s they also tend to retard progress because they
preclude others-absent permissIOn from the patent-holder-from
experimenting with and building upon whatever it is that is protected by

166. See Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?,
59 ALA. L. REv. 453, 465-72 & n.104 (2008).
167. See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18
CEO. MASON L. REv. 43, 50 (2010) (quoting U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Kurt Van Thomme, Note, Prosecution History Estoppel After Festo: Can an
Equivalent Ever Break Through the File Wrapper?, 53 DRAKE L. REv. 1099, 1124 (2005) (same).
168. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patent Law--Balancing Profit Maximization and Public
Access to Technology, 4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 26 (2002), http://www.stlr.org/html/
volume4/beckennan.pdf; Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, Efficiency Traik-OfJs in Patent
Litigation Settlements: Analysis Gone Astray?, 39 U.S.F. L. REv. 33, 33 (2004) ("Patents are
intended to allow a patent holder to obtain monopoly profits. To have this effect, a patent must
limit competition."); Cregory N. Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry's Unintended
Admission that Biotech Patents Fail Enablement, 1 I VA. J.L. & TECH. I, 'II 20, at 7 (2006) ("Patent
exclusivity rights limit competition .... ").
169. See Franklin Pierce Law Center's Sixth Biennial Patent System Major Problems Conference, 37
IDEA 623,654 (1997) ("[P]atents inherently limit access to some degree .... The access issue
is applicable to many types of technologies .... ").
170. Some non-economic, reputational benefits may also be derived from patents. See
generally William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REv. 369 (2011).
171. Kevin Arquit, Partner, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Keynote Address at the
International Law Journal 2009 Symposium: Comparative Antitrust Policies in Mergers and
Acquisitions (Feb. 27, 2009), in 43 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 1, 17 (2010); see also Jeanne C. Fromer,
Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWAL. REv. 539, 548 (2009).
172. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Cen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
("[D]escription is the quid pro quo of the patent system; the public must receive meaningful
disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for a limited period of
time.").
173. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,513 (1917).
174. See Fromer, supra note 171, at 54g-50.
175· 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
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patent exclusivity.176 Ultimately, "[t]he economic significance of a patent
depends on its scope: the broader the scope, the larger the number of
competing products and processes that will infringe the patent,"177 and
therefore will be unavailable for public use during the lifetime of the
patent. 178 In other words, "[t]he greater patent protection is, the smaller the
benefit to competitors [and the public] from the information contained in
the patent grant because the less they can do with it."179
In a utilitarian calculus then, both too much and too little patent
protection is suboptimal. l80 Justice Breyer succinctly summed up the
dilemma when he observed that
sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," the
constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection.
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only
encourage research by providing monetary incentives for
invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage research by
impeding the free exchange of information, for example by forcing
researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by
leading them to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of
existing or pending patents, by requiring complex licensing

176. Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 382 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("It is
common practice to make an invention and to secure a patent to block off a competitor's
progress. By studying his ware and developing an improvement upon it, a concern may 'fence
in' its rival; by a series of such moves, it may pin the trade enemy within a technology which
rapidly becomes obsolete. As often as not such maneuvers retard, rather than promote, the
progress of the useful arts." (quoting WALTON HALE HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE
161 (1941» (internal quotation marks omitted»; Nathan Machin, Comment, Prospective Utility:
A New Interpretation of the Utility Requirement of Section IOI of the Patent Act, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 421,
43 8-39 (1999)·
177. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 839, 839 (1990).
178. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) ("[WJhoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
179. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCfURE OF
INTELLECfUAL PROPERlY LAw 298 (2003). The public may ultimately reap some benefit, for all
patents eventually expire and the disclosures contained therein "become a part of the public
stock of knowledge." Beidler v. United States, 253 U.S. 447, 453 (1920). During the lifetime of
the patent, however, the broader the scope of the patent and the lower the competition, the
less benefit the public will receive (and the higher cost it will pay for that benefit). See LAl'1DES &
POSNER, supra, at 29g-300.
180. Kevin Emerson Collins, Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law and the Problem of
Insufficient Thought Control, 2007 WIS. L. REv. 759, 767 (citing LANDES & POSNER, supra note
179, at 21-24).
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arrangements, and by raising the costs of using the patented
information, sometimes prohibitively SO.181
Patent law, then, must always maintain the uneasy balance between
providing sufficient incentives to invent and disclose, which in the
aggregate, promote further innovation and the common good, and
guarding against granting overly broad patents, which retard further
research and thus are detrimental to the common good. 182 It is hard to
imagine a grant of exclusive rights broader than one on "the laws of nature
and physical phenomena." It is impossible to "invent around" an unalterable
law of nature. The utilitarian balance then tips against granting such broad
patents. Considering that utilitarian arguments were of some significance in
the drafting of the Patent Clause and early Patent Acts, 18 3 the prohibition on
patenting laws of nature or physical phenomena, though not explicitly
written into the Constitution or the statutes, was understood to exist and was
consistent with the statutory scheme.
In addition to utilitarian economic arguments, a number of moral
justifications for patent law have been advanced. These justifications
generally hold that it is just to reward one's labor. For instance, John Locke
argued that "[w]hatsoever [anyone] removes out of the State that Nature
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with it, and joined to
it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property."18 4 Realizing
that pure application of his theory could result in unjust over-appropriation
of previously commonly held goOdS, 18 5 Locke maintained that such
appropriation is permissible "only so long as there be 'enough, and as good,
left in common for others."'186

181. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006)
(Breyer, j., dissenting) (citations omitted) (order dismissing certiorari as imprO\~dently
granted).
182. Clemens Kerle, International IP Protection for CMO-A Biotech Odyssey, 8 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REv. 147, 173 (2007) ("Every IP regime, whether national or international, strives to
establish a balance between providing sufficiently large incentives while not granting overly
broad exclusive rights, which would result in supra-marginal deadweight costs without
compensation tilrough offsetting innovation.").
183.
See Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 15501800,52 HAsTINGS LJ. 1255, 1256 n.7 (2001).
184. SeeJOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1970)
(1690 ).
185. See, e.g., David Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie Cohen's
"Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, " 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1151, I 160-61 (1998) ("If I
acquire unrestricted control over tile land, I am getting more than I have produced-which
may be unjust and may also lead to inefficient rent-seeking as individuals clear land in part to
appropriate its pre-existing value.").
186. Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor,
39 HAsTINGS LJ. I, 23 (1987) (quotingJOHN LOCKE, CONCERNING CML GOVERNMENT, SECOND
ESSAY, ch. V, § 26, in 35 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERl'J WORLD 30 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952)).
This is known as tile "Lockean proviso." Id.; see also David Elkins, Responding to Rawls: Toward a
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Similarly, Wilhelm Hegel's argument has been characterized to mean
that "to achieve proper self-development-to be a person-an individual
needs some control over resources in the external environment." ,8 i
According to Hegel, "[a]ttainments, erudition, talents, and so forth, are, of
course, owned by free mind and are something internal and not external to
it, but even so, by expressing them it may embody them in something
external and alienate them .... "188 Thus, in order to "propertize" one's
ideas, one needs to "embody them in something external,",8g which in a
patent context would be a requirement of describing the invention "in a
manner so full and exact, that anyone skilled in the science to which it
appertains, can, by using the means [the patentee] specifies, without any
addition to, or subtraction from them, produce precisely the result he
describes.",go
Under the Locke-Hegel moraljustification approach, foreclosing
patent eligibility for the "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas" is wholly appropriate. 19 1 Not only are "laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas" not the products of anyone's labors,'9 2 but
appropriating them for one's exclusive use (to the extent it is possible)
necessarily leaves everyone else worse off. Whereas previously they had
unlimited right to put laws of nature and natural phenomena to beneficial
use, post exclusive appropriation of these things, they are no longer able to
do so. Thus, it cannot be said that mere discovery and observation of the

Consistent and Supportable Theory of DistributiveJustice, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 267, 275 (2007) ("Where
resources are limited and the appropriation by one would negatively impact the ability of others
to act similarly, the Lockean proviso would act to deny the laborer's claim to exclusive rights in
the product. Locke, therefore, limited the right to expropriate scarce natural resources for
private use."); Jeremy Waldron, Kant's Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1535, 1550 (1996)
(noting that when one takes "more than his share," he is violating Lockean principles).
187. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 957 (1982)
(emphasis omitted).
.
188. HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 43, at 41 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1965) (1821).
189.

!d.

190. O'Reillyv. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62,119 (1854) (emphasis added).
191. Joan E. Schaffner, Patent Preemption Unlocked, 1995 WIS. L. REv. 1081, 1091 (quoting In
re Aiappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F·3d 943 (Fed. Cir.
2008» (internal quotation marks omitted) ("Additionally, the federal patent statute, pursuant
to the patentability criteria, defines and sets standards for the four Lockean conditions
described above. First, the federal patent statute satisfies the 'labor' requirement of Locke by
limiting the grant of property protection to enumerated eligible subject matter-manufacture,
machine, process, and composition of matter. Thus, 'laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas' are ineligible for patent protection." (footnotes omitted) (quoting In re Alappat,
33 F·3 d at 1542».
192. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (stating that
naturally occurring qualities of bacteria are not the result of the labor of the inventor, but
rather "the work of nature").
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"laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" is sufficient external
embodiment to allow the discoverer exclusive property rights.
The moral philosophy of John Rawls lends further support to the idea
that patent protection should not be available for discovering laws of nature
or natural phenomena. 193 In a Rawlsian world, justice demands first that
everyone has the same rights and access to basic liberties,194 and second, that
to the extent that there are economic inequalities, they be permitted to exist
only if in the long run they benefit those least well-off. '95 Additionally, Rawls
insists that decisions on the rules to govern society be made in the "original
position" or "behind the veil of ignorance"-i.e., not knowing what our
starting position in life will be. ' 96
What follows from the Rawlsian approach (as argued by Robert Merges
in his book, JustifYing Intellectual Property) '97 is that while some patent
protection is permissible and perhaps even desirable,19 8 overly broad patent
protection that assigns too many resources to one individual (and therefore
results in an unequal distribution) is not permissible. 199 In the Rawlsian
paradigm, granting exclusive rights to a natural phenomenon or law of
nature violates the second principle because the inequality created does not
benefit the least well-off in society and perhaps even hurts them (by
foreclosing the opportunity for others to provide competing products that
would be governed by the patented law ofnature).2oo

193. Of course, Rawls lived too late (1921-2002) to be of any influence on the Founding
Fathers or the early judges and justices of the United States. Nonetheless, his approach is
helpful in forming a solid basis for deciding whether intellectual property can be justified in
today's world, and ifso, to what extent.
194. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 46, at 266 (2d ed. 1999).
195. Id.
196. Id. § 24, at 118-23.
197. See generally ROBERT P. MERGES,jUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 102-35 (2011).
198. Of course, if Merges is wrong, then no IP protection ought to be available at all and
the talk of limiting patent rights would become moot.
199. See MERGES, supra note 197, at 126--33.
200.
See, e.g., Eli, supra note 23, at 372-73 ("[Glranting patents on isolated DNA creates a
potential for a lack of price competition on products controlled by few indi\~duals. When a
genetic testing company, such as Myriad Genetics, obtains exclusive control to a DNA sequence,
the company consequently has the exclusive control over the use of the sequence necessary to
develop the screening tests." (footnote omitted».
Narrow patents, on the other hand, strengthen the competition (and therefore benefit
consumers) by encouraging competitors to design around the patent. See Michelle Armond,
Comment, Introducing the Defense of Independent Invention to Motions for Preliminary Injunctions in
Patent Infringement Lawsuits, 91 CALIF. L. REv. 1 17, 149 n.l 78 (2003) ("One of the benefits of a
patent system is its sCKalled 'negative incentive' to 'design around' a competitor's products,
even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace."
(quoting State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 1985»);
Georgia E. Kralovic, Comment, The Principle of Fair Notice: Is It Prudent Guidance for the Future of
Patent Law?, 26 PEPP.L. REv. 89, 93 (1998).
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In summary, all theories, whether based on moral or economic
arguments or both, converge on the fundamental point that the most basic
knowledge and discoveries about laws of nature and physical phenomena
ought not be eligible for patent protection even if the knowledge is new and
useful. This convergence helps put the judicial decisions reading the "law of
nature/natural phenomena" exception into the patent statutes in proper
context.
C.

RECONCILING THE BROAD LANGUAGE OF THE PATENT ACT AND THE NATURAL
LA W EXCEPTION

In the previous Subparts I have described that the exclusion for laws of
nature and natural phenomena from patent eligibility has a long legal and
philosophical pedigree. At the same time, as Chief Judge Markey observed:
"Only God works from nothing. Men must work with old elements."ZOI Thus,
to some extent, all inventions utilize and apply laws of nature to solve
problems at hand. If the "law of nature" bar were too broad, no invention
would ever be patent eligible. Mter all, an antibiotic drug only works
because it exploits a naturally occurring bacterial vulnerability to a particular
chemical interaction;oz and an airplane flies only because of Bernoulli's
forces-a natural phenomenon. zo3 Yet, an airplane is patent eligible;o4 as
are newly discovered antibiotics.z o 5 So how do the courts draw the line
between patent-ineligible "phenomena of nature [and] laws of nature" and
patent-eligible "application of [that] law of nature to a new and useful
end"?zo6
This differentiation is especially difficult in biological arts where the
interaction of various chemical entities and organisms are governed by the
immutable laws of nature,"o7 but where such interaction is only brought

201. Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1556 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(quoting Howard T. Markey, Why Not the Statute?, 65 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 331, 334 (1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
202. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 1521-22.
203.
See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Patent Office Meets the Poison Pill: Why Legal Methods Cannot
Be Patented, 20 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 333, 336 (2007).
204.
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (filed Mar. 23, 1903) (patent by the Wright Brothers
directed to a "Flying-Machine").
205.
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,670,444 (filed May 29, 1984) (patent directed to antibiotic
Ciprofloxacin and held by Bayer A.G.); see also Bayer AG v. Carlsbad Tech., Inc., 298 F.3d 1377,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Bayer AG and Bayer Corporation (collectively Bayer) filed a patent
application on May 29, 1984 that ultimately issued as the '444 patent on June 2, 1987. The
subject matter of the '444 patent includes the antibiotic ciprofloxacin sold by Bayer under the
brand name CIPRO®.").
206. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
207. Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 1946) ("[A] molecule is the
inevitable result of the action of so-called laws of nature which are immutable .... "); Jana R.
McCreary, This Is the Trap the Courts Built: Dealing with the Entanglement oj Religion and the Origin oj
Life in American Public Schools, 37 sw. U. L. REv. 1, 21 (2008) ("[A]II biological elements and
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about by human intervention. 2os Courts have struggled (and muddled
through) this distinction for decades without finding a clear-cut and brightline resolution to the dispute. 2og Though the decisions have not successfully
delineated a legal bright line between "laws of nature" and "application of
laws of nature," some guideposts can be gleaned from a review of those
decisions.
One early guidepost comes from Judge Learned Hand in Parke-Davis &
Co. v. H.K. Mulford CO.210 There, the patent was directed to highly purified
and concentrated adrenaline 21l -a naturally occurring hormone. 212 Despite
the fact that adrenaline occurs naturally, had a generally known function
and structure, and had been used therapeutically, Judge Hand upheld the
patent. 213 He reasoned that the purified and concentrated form of
adrenaline, separated as it was from the surrounding gland tissue, was
different in kind from adrenaline naturally flowing through a person's (or
other mammal's) body.21 4 According to Judge Hand, the patentee in
question
was the first to make it available for any use by removing it from the
other gland-tissue in which it was found, and, while it is of course
possible logically to call this a purification of the principle, it
became for every practical purpose a new thing commercially and
therapeutically."5

processes are ultimately obedient to the laws of physics and chemistry." (quoting Edward O.
Wilson, Let's Accept the Fault Line Between Faith and Science, USA TODAY,Jan. 15,2006, available at
2006 WLNR 840576».
208.
See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (recognizing that the
bacteria in question was man-made even though its behavior was governed by the laws of
nature); Schering Corp., 153 F.2d at 432 (recognizing that the molecule in question was manmade even though it obeyed the laws of nature).
209. Indeed, in a recent oral argument, Justice Breyer obseIVed that "[ilf you look at the
Court's cases, they seem to say Flook, one thing, and Diehr, another thing." Transcript of Oral
Argument at 14, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012)
(No. 10-1150).
210. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 98 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
2 II.
Id. at 96.
2 I 2. Adrenaline is a hormone produced by the adrenal gland and is used in the "fight-orflight" response (e.g., enhanced glucose mobilization, increased heart and breathing rates,
differential distribution of blood flow to various body organs, etc.). See generally Daniel H.
Funkenstein, The Physiology of Fear and Anger, in PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 223, 223-33 (Charles F.
Reed et al. eds., 1958). Adrenaline may be administered to treat anaphylactic shock (i.e., a
severe and life-threatening allergic reaction). See Marie Plicka, Note, Mr. Peanut Goes to Court:
Accommodating an Individual's Peanut Allergy in Schools and Day Care Centers Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 14J.L. & HEALTH 87, 90-91 (1999-2000).
213.
Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 114-15.
214.
Id. at 103.
215.
Id.
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There is certainly some truth to Judge Hand's observation that the
discovery that gave rise to the patent in Parke-Davis dramatically broadened
the therapeutic (and thus commercial) opportunities for adrenaline., ,6
However, it is equally true that the extracting, purifying, and concentrating
of adrenaline did not change its chemical compound or alter its function." 7
Nonetheless, the Parke-Davis opinion (though written by a single district
judge) has been widely cited and relied on for the proposition that a
"purified" form of a naturally occurring substance may be patent eligible." s
Parke-Davis, although it provides one guidepost, certainly does not
establish a clear and simple rule for determining patent eligibility, and the
Supreme Court did little to clarify matters in later cases. In Funk Bros. Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant CO.,.19 the patent claims were directed to a bacterial
mixture. 22o Each of the bacterial strains in the mixture was both naturally
occurring and well known.'" The mixture of the specific strains, however,
was neither. The benefit of the mixture was its ability to promote growth in a
wide variety of leguminous plants. 222 The Supreme Court, per Justice
Douglas,223 held that the subject matter of the invention did not qualify for
216. Ashley McHugh, Note, Invalidating Gene Patents: Association for Molecular Pathology v.
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 62 HAsTINGS LJ. 185, 209 (2010) ("The prior art [to the
Parke-Davis patent], powdered suprarenal glands, contained some desired therapeutic
properties, but could not be safely administered in humans.").
217. Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 107 ("The chemical reactions of what now is ascertained to have
been, and what was supposed to be, the active principle, had undoubtedly all been known just
as they are set forth in the patent .... ").
218. See, e.g., Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1352, 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom.
Myriad/Il, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012); Merck & CO. V. Olin Mathieson Chern. Corp., 253 F.2d 156,
162-63 (4th Cir. 1958); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 975 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated as moot,
Diamond V. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980); In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A.
1970); see also In re Mays, 175 F.2d 570, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1949). A quick LexisNexis search
revealed that the case is also cited and discussed in over 175 law review articles.
219. Funk Bros. Seed CO. V. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
220. U.S. Patent No. 2,200,532 (filed Aug. 24, 1938).
221.
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 129-30.
222.

[d.

223. Justice Douglas generally took a dim view of patents and the exclusivity rights they
granted. See, e.g., Gottschalk V. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (Douglas,]., authoring the majority
opinion declaring that an application for a patent covering a method for converting binarycoded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals on a general purpose digital computer
must be denied as too abstract); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S.
57 (1969) (Douglas,]., authoring the majority opinion finding patents invalid as obvious);
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (Douglas,]., joining the judgment finding
patents invalid for obviousness); Wilbur-Ellis CO. V. Kuther, 377 U.S. 422 (1964) (Douglas,].,
authoring the majority opinion limiting the reach of the infringement cause of action when a
patented product is repaired or replaced); Aro Mfg. CO. V. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,
365 U.S. 336 (1961) (Douglas,].,joining in a judgment limiting the reach of the infringement
cause of action when a patented product is repaired or replaced); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612 (1950) (Douglas,]., dissenting from a judgment that
upheld a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Mandel Bros. v. Wallace,
335 U.S. 291, 296 (1948) (Douglas, j., concurring in a judgment invalidating a patent as
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patent protection because, in the opinion of the Court, the useful qualities
of the bacterial mixtures were "the work of nature ... [and] of course not
patentable [, for] patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of
nature."224 Though the patentee was the first one to discover that mixing
certain strains of bacteria would result in a new, heretofore unknown
product that was commercially usefuV 25 the Court opined:
Discovery of the fact that certain strains of each species of these
bacteria can be mixed without harmful effect to the properties of
either is a discovery of their qualities of non-inhibition. It is no
more than the discovery of some of the handiwork of nature and
hence is not patentable. The aggregation of select strains of the
several species into one product is an application of that newlydiscovered natural principle .... No species acquires a different
use. The combination of species produces no new bacteria, no
change in the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the
range of their utility.226 Each species has the same effect it always
had. The bacteria perform in their natural way. Their use in
combination does not improve In any way their natural
functioning. 227
The rule announced in Funk Bros., if faithfully applied, would preclude
patenting a vast amount of discoveries in biological sciences. After all, these
discoveries all exploit the natural qualities of bacteria, viruses, proteins,
nucleic acids, etc. Unlocking the secrets of these biological materials and
putting them to use would be, if the Funk Bros. rule were followed, merely
"an application of [a] newly-discovered natural principle."228 At the same
time, Funk Bros. at last announced a clear, if highly problematic, rule.
Nonetheless, this state of affairs would not last. "Although the Funk Brothers

covering non-patent-eligible subject matter); Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 127 (Douglas,]., authoring
the majority opinion invalidating a patent); Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325
U.S. 327, 335 (1945) (Douglas,]., concurring in a judgment that invalidated a patent);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 280 (1944) (Douglas,].,
concurring in a judgment that invalidated a patent); Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 316 U.S. 364, 371 (1942) (Douglas,]., dissenting from the judgment that upheld patent
validity).
224. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.
225. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 196 F.3d 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
226. This, of course, is a questionable proposition. The very point of the mixture was that it
could be used on a wider variety of leguminous plants, whereas each individual strain of
bacteria is limited to a smaller range. Thus, the utility of the bacteria in mixture is much higher
than the utility of it outside of mixture.
227. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131.
228. [d.
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decision has never been overruled, in retrospect it seems to represent the
high-water mark in the 'products of nature' doctrine."·29
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty developed and
attempted to patent a genetically modified bacterium capable of breaking
down crude oil.'3 0 The USPTO rejected the application and Dr. Chakrabarty
appealed.23 1 In reversing the USPTO's decision, the Supreme Court
distinguished (without overruling) Funk Bros. by holding that Chakrabarty's
"claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a
non naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter-a product
of human ingenuity 'having a distinctive name, character [and] use. ""3' The
Court went on to say that while in Funk Bros. each strain of the bacteria
present in the mixture retained its original and nature-endowed qualities,
the Chakrabarty bacterium had new qualities that were given to it by the
inventor.' 33 Under this reasoning, though bacteria are naturally occurring
organisms, modified bacteria with non-naturally occurring biological
properties are patent eligible.2 34
In 2012, the Court added another guidepost when it decided Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.' 35 In Prometheus, the patent
claim was directed to a method of adjusting medical treatment depending
on the amount of active metabolite in the patient's blood.23 6 The patented
method involved just three steps: (1) administering a well-known drug,
(2) measuring the level of the drug's metabolite, and (3) considering
changing the drug's dose depending on the measurement results.237 The
Court held this invention ineligible for a patent, concluding that the
relationship between a metabolite's concentration and a drug's effect is a
pure law of nature.'3 8 The Court further concluded that the addition of the
"administering" and "measuring" steps did not make the claim patent
eligible because "simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high
level of generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
cannot make those laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable."2 39 In short, "[i]f
a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process reciting a law of
nature, unless that process has additional features that provide practical

229. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY LJ. 721,725 (1990).
230. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
231. [d. at 306.
232. [d. at 30g-10 (alteration in original) (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609,
615 (1887)).
233. [d. at 310.
234. See id. at 309-10.
235. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
236. [d. at 1295.
237. [d. at 1299.
238. [d. at 1302.
239. [d. at 1300.
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assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the law of nature itself."24
This is where the law presently stands."4 1 The Court has continued to
adhere to the idea that "laws of nature" and "natural phenomena" are not
patent-eligible subject matter."4 2 Nevertheless, it has wavered on the
corollary to that doctrine-patent eligibility of the "applications of the laws
of nature." It is not surprising, then, that in recent debates on the patent
eligibility of genetic materials even the federal government, as a whole,
could not agree on a uniform position."43 Nonetheless, as incoherent as the
application of the current Supreme Court doctrine to real cases is, the
doctrine itself can serve to separate the discoveries of "laws of nature, [which
are] free to all men and reserved exclusively to none,"244 and inventions,
which apply those laws of nature to create "for every practical purpose a new
thing commercially and therapeutically."245 This dichotomy legitimately
finds its roots in the theory of patent law and can be applied, consistent with
that theory, to questions of patent eligibility for genetic materials. This will
be my task in Part IV. However, prior to embarking on that task, I will briefly
elaborate on the additional requirement of novelty that the Patent Act
imposes on applicants.
0

240. Id. at 1297.
241. For now I exclude from discussion the Myriad I and Myriad II cases that directly
address gene patenting. I am doing so because instead of positing that case as the current legal
standard, I wish to consider whether it was correctly decided in the next Part. I also omit
discussion of Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), which is the most recent Supreme Court
case on patent eligibility under § 101. I do so because Bilski's patent was rejected on the
grounds that it was an "abstract idea," rather than on the grounds that it was a law of nature. Id.
at 3230; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
242. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 ("[WJhile an abstract idea, law of nature, or mathematical
formula could not be patented, 'an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a
known structure or process may well be deseIVing of patent protection.'" (quoting Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (emphasis omitted».
243. The positions taken by the Solicitor General's Office and the USPTO in the Myriad
litigation were quite different. The USPTO (in its District Court brief) argued that isolated and
purified genes are in fact patent eligible. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant United
States Patent and Trademark Office's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and in Opposition
to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 20-23, Myriad 1,702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515 (RWS», 2009 WL 5785024, affd in part, rev'd in part, 653 F.3d 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Myriad III, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). The Solicitor General,
however, argued that genes that are merely purified and isolated are not patent eligible. Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 17-36, Myriad II, 653 F'3d
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 4853320, at *17-36, vacated sub nom. Myriad
III, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). The Solicitor General's Office did agree with the PTO that cDNA is
patent eligible. Id. at 14-17.
244. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
245. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

98:1399

D. BEYOND PA TENT ELlGIBILlTY-THE NOVELTY REQUIREMENT
Until now, I have been focusing on the patent eligibility of an invention.
Eligibility, though, is but an initial inquiry in determining whether the
applicant is actually entitled to a patent and the exclusive rights associated
with it. Section 101 of the Patent Act (which has been the focus of this Part
thus far) reads: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title."24 6 Only if the invention satisfies all other
requirements of Title 35 is it patentable. Judge Rich 2 47 described the system
thus:
Achieving the ultimate goal of a patent under those statutory
provisions involves, to use an analogy, having the separate keys to
open in succession the three doors of sections 101, 102, and 103,
the last two guarding the public interest by assuring that patents
are not granted which would take from the public that which it
already enjoys (matters already within its knowledge whether in
actual use or not) or potentially enjoys by reason of obviousness
from knowledge which it already has.

The first door which must be opened on the difficult path to
patentability is § 101 (augmented by the § 100 definitions) ...
whether [the] invention is patentable or not.... If the invention,
as the inventor defines it in his claims ... falls into anyone of the
named categories, he is allowed to pass through to the second
door, which is § 102; "novelty and loss of right to patent" is the sign
on it.

The third door, under the

1952

Act, is §

103 . . . .

Section 103 ... refers to the difference between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known
before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time [the
invention was made] to a person [ordinarily] skilled in the art,
then the subject matter cannot be patented.

246. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
247. Giles Rich was not only the preeminent expositor of patent law as a judge, he was also
(prior to ascending to his seat on the bench) one of the primary authors of the 1952 Patent
Act. See A. Samuel Oddi, Regeneration in American Patent Law: Statutory Subject Matter, 46 IDEA
491,546 (2006).
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If the inventor holds the three different keys to the three doors,
his invention (here assumed to be "useful") qualifies for a patent,
otherwise not .... '4 8
The mere fact that someone has worked with patent-eligible subject
matter does not entitle him to a patent unless (1) the work resulted in
something new (i.e., something not previously described or discovered)'49
and (2) the result is a fairly significant improvement upon prior art (i.e., not
an obvious, from the perspective of an ordinary skilled artisan, variation on
the previous state of affairs).·5 "To allow otherwise would not only add
nothing to the sum of human knowledge, but 'would in fact injure the
public by removing existing knowledge from public use. ''''5 1
Under KSR International Co. v. Telejlex Inc., whenever "there are a finite
number of identified, predictable solutions . . . [that] lead[] to the
anticipated success," the invention is viewed as "obvious to try" and is not
patentable. '5' Though progress in the chemical arts is held to be more
unpredictable than in other fields,.53 "[a] known [chemical] compound may
suggest its homolog, analog, or isomer because such compounds 'often have
similar properties and therefore chemists of ordinary skill would ordinarily
contemplate making them to try to obtain compounds with improved
properties."'·54 This approach means that mere minor alterations in a
known chemical compound would likely fail the post-KSR obviousness
analysis.
0

248. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960-62 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (alterations in original) (emphasis
omitted), vacated as moot, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
249. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). I am not going to discuss this section because
it is almost never an issue in chemical cases. In order for an application to fail the § 102 test,
the prior art has to disclose the exact same invention. See Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v.
Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 780 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[AJnticipation under § 102 can be found only
when the reference discloses exactly what is claimed . . . . [WJhere there are differences
between the reference disclosure and the claim, the rejection must be based on § 103 which
takes differences into account."). As a result, for any chemical entity (which a nucleic acid is) to
escape rejection under § 102 all that is necessary is to show that neither an identical compound
nor a generic species encompassing the compound has been previously disclosed. Cf Takeda
Chern. Indus., Ltd. v. A1phapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that
even when a chemical compound is a "homolog, analog, or isomer," the proper inquiry is
obviousness under § 103 rather than anticipation under § 102).
250. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
251. Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE LJ. 919, 931 (2011)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148
(1989».
252. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,421 (2007).
253. See Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy's Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
254. Takeda, 49 2 F·3d at 1356 (quoting In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995».
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IV. PATENT EUGIBIUlYOF GENETIC MATERIALS

Now that the science of DNA research and the legal framework for
patentability have been discussed and clarified, we can apply the governing
legal standards to this field of scientific endeavor. In this Part I will discuss
how, in my view, the patent eligibility of genetic materials should be treated
under the present law in light of the case law and the philosophical
underpinnings of those decisions.
As noted above, there are four distinct possibilities when it comes to
patenting DNA molecules. First, one could simply patent the natural
sequence of a newly discovered gene as it appears on the chromosome in its
native state. In other words, the only limitation of the claim would be the
sequence of nucleotides. Second, one could patent a gene that is separated
from the rest of the genetic code on the chromosome and associated
protein structures. In this situation, in addition to being limited to the newly
discovered sequence, the patent claim would also be limited to this sequence
occurring in a "stand-alone" molecule. However, other than the
requirement that this be a stand-alone molecule and thus free from all of
the associated protein and nucleic acid structures, the claim would be
directed to the same sequence that occurs in vivo. The third option would be
to patent a genetic sequence containing protein coding regions only (i.e.,
cDNA). A claim of this type would be limited to a stand-alone molecule
containing only the protein-encoding part of the gene. Importantly,
whatever type of molecule is selected for patenting, each of the above three
choices will carry the same coding information because each of these
molecules (whether in the native state or stand-alone, and whether introns
are present or absent) will code for the same target protein. Finally, the
fourth option would be to patent a newly discovered association between a
certain trait and a particular genetic sequence.

A. NA TIVE IN SITU DNA
Turning to the first of the possibilities-attempting to patent a newly
discovered genetic sequence in situ-the answer should be rather easy and
apparent. Such sequences, regardless of how hard and expensive they are to
find, how new they may be, and how much useful information they provide,
are in no sense of the word "invented." They are mere products of nature,
already present in a genetic sequence of an organism (human or otherwise).
Their discovery, though useful, does not convert them into a new product,
does not create for them a new function, and does not transform them into
"a new thing commercially and therapeutically."'55 Furthermore, granting
exclusive rights on such discoveries would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and economic underpinnings of patent law. Such patents
255.

Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd in

part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
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would fail under a Lockean labor theory because no labor was expended to
create the genes. Not only that, granting patents on in situ DNA would fail
the Lockean proviso because such exclusive rights would preclude all uses of
those sequences and therefore would not leave "enough, and as good" for
the rest of mankind. 25 6
The same result obtains in a Hegelian approach because the person
attempting to claim the gene in situ would not be producing or embodying
his ideas in any external medium capable of alienation. 25 7 Instead, such a
discoverer would merely attempt to lay claim to something that has been
"produced" and "embodied" long before he ever appeared. Exclusivity on
the genes in situ also runs counter to the Rawlsian and utilitarian
considerations, and largely for the same reasons. Granting a patent on a
gene in situ results in a very broad grant of exclusive rights. It may be that
such an exclusive right would prevent one from working not just on the
newly discovered gene, but also on its neighbors and surrounding
structures. 258 Because the patented gene would be embedded in a
chromosome and surrounded by other genes, as well as by structural
proteins, it may well become impossible to conduct research on the
neighboring regions without infringing the patent. At the very least, the cost
of conducting such research would rise dramatically as scientists would have
to take precautionary measures to avoid infringing on patents claiming
genetic information located near their area of research. 2 59 Thus, granting
such patents would be economically inefficient and would slow down
scientific progress, thus disadvantaging the least fortunate even further (as
they would have to wait longer for medical and scientific breakthroughs). In
short, both the case law and the fundamental principles underlying patent
law support denying patent claims drawn to genetic sequences in situ.

B.

ISOLATED AND PURIFIED DNA

The next possibility to consider is the patent eligibility of isolated and
purified DNA whose sequence is identical to its native DNA counterpart. On
one hand, these DNA molecules are not only mechanically separated from
their associated protein structures, but they are also cleaved from the rest of
256. Edelman, supra note 186, at 23 (quoting LOCKE, supra note 186, ch. V, § 26 (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
257. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
259. Wenrong Huang, Enzo s Written Description Requirement: Can It Be an Effective Check
Against Overly Broad Biotechnology Claims?, 16 ALB. LJ. SCI. & TECH. 1, 24 (2006) ("[A]n ordinary
competitor deciding which research and development project to pursue would have to make a
difficult choice of either risking infringement of a broad patent or foregoing an otherwise valid
project to avoid the claimed research area. Considering the high research and development
COSts associated with biotechnology products, a claim broad enough to cover a whole research
area might well be enough to dissuade other people from engaging or investing in that area in
the first place.").
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the chromosome. As a result, the isolated DNA is "a molecule with a
different ionic charge, different chemical bonds, [different molecular
weight], and a different chemical composition, as compared to the [native
DNA]."26o This particular product does not occur in nature and appears only
as a result of human activity-the sine qua non of patent eligibility.
Additionally, the three-dimensional structure of the DNA molecule
depends on both the sequence of nucleotides and the binding of associated
proteins. When the DNA of interest is cleaved from the neighboring DNA
and is separated from the surrounding proteins, this three-dimensional
structure changes. As a result, the function of isolated DNA differs somewhat
from the native in situ DNA. Thus, isolating and purifying the gene of
interest results in "a new thing commercially and therapeutically."261 Indeed,
even the district court that found isolated DNA to be patent ineligible
conceded the point. 262
On this view, then, isolated DNA fits comfortably within the Parke-Davis
and Chakrabarty line of cases. Because isolated DNA "control[s] the [nature]
as to make it accomplish the purpose" 26 3 of being a diagnostic or therapeutic
tool, because it is "a new thing commercially and therapeutically," 264 and
because it is "a non naturally occurring manufacture or composition of
matter-a product of human ingenuity 'having a distinctive name, character
[and] use, "' 26 5 it constitutes patent-eligible subject matter.
On the other hand, despite being isolated and having different chemical
structures and properties, these molecules have the same biological
properties as the native DNA. The isolated DNA retains the same sequence
of nucleotides as the native DNA, and therefore, when translated, codes for

260. Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 20 II) (Moore,]., concurring in judgment),
vacated sub nom. Myriad III, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
261. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aJfd in
part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
262. Myriad 1,702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 196-g7 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Purified or synthesized DNA
may be used as tools for biotechnological applications for which native DNA cannot be used.
For example, unlike native DNA, purified or synthesized DNA may be used as a 'probe,' which
is a diagnostic tool that a molecular biologist uses to target and bind to a particular segment of
DNA, thus allowing the target DNA sequence to be detectable using standard laboratory
machinery. Purified or synthesized DNA can also be used as a 'primer' to sequence a target
DNA, a process used by molecular biologists to determine the order of nucleotides in a DNA
molecule, or to perform polymerase chain reaction ('PCR') amplification, a process which
utilizes target-DNA specific primers to duplicate the quantity of target DNA exponentially."
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted)), aJfd in part, rev'd in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2011), vacated sub nom. Myriad III, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
263. Dolbearv. Am. Bell Tel. Co. (The Telephone Case), 126 U.S. 1,532 (1888).
264. Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 103.
265. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 30g-1O (1980) (alteration in original)
(quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609,615 (1887)).
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the same sequence of amino acids. 266 Though it is true that once a gene is
cleaved from its larger surrounding structure (the chromosome) it acquires
"a different ionic charge, different chemical bonds, [different molecular
weight], and a different chemical composition,"267 it is equally true that no
changes other than to terminal nucleotides of the gene are made. 268 Thus,
human creativity is arguably minimal and it can plausibly be argued that
isolated DNA fits within the Funk Bros. and Prometheus framework.
Viewed from this perspective, it can be said that each isolated DNA
molecule "has the same effect it always had. The [DNA] perform[s] in [its]
natural way. [Its] use in [isolation] does not improve in any way [its] natural
functioning."26 9 It can be argued that the creation of these molecules is
nothing more than "appending conventional steps ... to laws of nature,"27
thus robbing these molecules of patent eligibility.
In short, on the question of whether isolated DNA is patent eligible,
legal precedents provide support for either outcome depending on one's
view of whether the chemical or biological properties are important. The legal
arguments for and against patent eligibility of isolated DNA, based on the
case law as it currently stands, are at (or nearly at) equipoise. What, in my
view, tips the balance of scales towards eligibility is congressional
acquiescence in the practice of issuing patents on isolated DNA. The
USPTO has been issuing patents on genetic materials since 1982.271 Since
1982, Congress has had multiple opportunities to amend the Patent Act and
exclude genetic materials from eligibility. In the same time period, Congress
has enacted several statutes that amended the Patent Act. The Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (popularly known as
0

266. Recall that the DNA code is conserved and that what matters in producing a proper
protein sequence is not the "ionic charge," or "chemical bonds," or molecular weight, or
"chemical composition," Myriad fl, 653 F.3d 1329, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom.
Myriad Ifl, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), but the linear sequence of nucleotides. See supra notes 66-87
and accompanying text.
267. Myriadfl, 653 F.3d at 1361.
268. Admittedly, some of the nucleotides may no longer be chemically modified, as they
were in the native state. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
269. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
270. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300 (2012). In
fact, following its decision in Prometheus, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit's
decision in Myriad fl and sent the case back for further consideration in light of Prometheus.
Myriad Ill, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
271. See U.S. Patent No. 4,447,538 (filed Feb. 5, 1982); Gene Patents and Global Competition
Issues: Protection of Biotechnology Under Patent Law, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Jan. 1, 2006),
http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/ gene-patents-and-global-<:ompeti tion-issues/ 1 163/
("In 1982, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued the first gene
patent to Regents of the University of California for work carried out on the construction of a
plasmid contained in a bacterium and expression of genes for chorionic
somatomammotropin. ").
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the "Hatch-Waxman Act")27 2 altered the legal landscape for patents on drugs
and medical devices.273 In 1996, Congress amended the Patent Act to add
§ 287 (c), which immunized physicians from liability for infringing patents
directed to methods of treatment.2 74 The Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 2004 prohibited the use of federal money "to issue patents on claims
directed to or encompassing a human organism."2 75 This prohibition
continued from year to year in various appropriation bills,27 6 and was finally
codified as a substantive exclusion from patent eligibility in the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act of 2011. 277 Despite these (and other) amendments to
the Patent Act, Congress never saw fit to exclude genetic materials from
patent protection-and it is not for lack of notice that Congress did not act.
Bills proposing a carve-out from § 101 for genetic materials were filed in
Congress by members of both parties.2 78 Yet Congress failed to move these
bills forward. Additionally, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act was
adopted after the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Myriad II, upholding
patent eligibility for isolated DNA despite the Department of Justice's
pOSItIOn that isolated DNA is not patent eligible.2 79 The Department of
Justice'S position, in turn, contravened the long standing practice and
position of the USPTO, setting up a split in the executive branch 280 and
making the issue all the more acute. Still, Congress chose not to act, leaving
the law as it has been for almost thirty years. Though Prometheus may cast
doubt on this conclusion,281 in my view the congressional decision to allow

272. Drug Price Competition and Patent Tenn Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)
(2006 & Supp. V 2011».
273. Under the Act, certain uses of patented products, while infringing activity, do not in
and of themselves give rise to a cause of action for legal or equitable relief. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 (e)(I).
274. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616, 110
Stat. 3009, 300g-67 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c».
275. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 634, 118 Stat. 3,
101.
276. O. Carter Snead, Public Bioethies and the Bush Presidency, 32 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'y 867,
887 n.62 (2009) ("The Weldon Amendment has been reauthorized every year since its
enactment.") .
277. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284,340 (2011)
(to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 101).
278. See, e.g., Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, llOth Congo (2007)
(showing a bill sponsored by one Republican and five Democratic Representatives); Genomic
Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th Congo (2002) (showing a
bill sponsored by one Republican and two Democratic Representatives).
279. The Federal Circuit decided Myriad II on July 29, 2011. The Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act passed the House on June 23, 2011, the Senate on September 8, 2011, and was
signed into law on September 16, 2011. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 125 Stat. 284.
280. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
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the USPTO to continue issuing patents on DNA is indicative of a
congressional view that genetic material is patent eligible. 282
Whether the isolated DNA is patent eligible under the current law as a
descriptive matter, though, does not resolve the question of whether it
should be patent eligible as a normative matter. Unfortunately, the
theoretical framework of patent law is also not of much help. On one hand,
Locke's labor theory would suggest that because labor goes into sequencing
and isolating the gene, that labor should be rewarded with a patent grant.
On the other hand, the reward may very well exceed the labor invested,
perhaps by orders of magnitude. Yet, Lockean theory suggests that the
reward for labor should be commensurate with the labor itself, especially
when one is permitted to withdraw matters from the commons. 28 3
The other theories offer equally conflicting conclusions. A Hegelian
approach suggests that isolated DNA is an external embodiment of the
specific "[a] ttainments, erudition, [and] talents" of the scientists who
sequenced, isolated, and purified the gene of interest, and is capable of
being propertized and therefore patent eligible. 284 However, what is being
propertized is actually much greater than the mere external embodiment of
the "[a]ttainments, erudition, [and] talents" of people who sequenced and
isolated the gene. Instead, what is being propertized is the" [a] ttainments,

282. I recognize that "congressional acquiescence" is not the strongest of indications of
congressional views on the subject. See, e.g., Marjorie A. Silver, Evening the Odds: The Case for
Attorneys' Fee Awards for Administrative Resolution of Title VI and Title VII Disputes, 67 N.C. L. REv.
379, 403-04 (1989) ("[TJhe doctrine of legislative acquiescence in judicial constmction of
congressional enactments generally supports only a weak inference of congressional
intent .... "); see also Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 19B1
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 205 (1983); Richard J. Nelson, Note, Regulation of
Investigational New Drugs: "Giant Step for the Sick and Dying"?, 77 CEO. LJ. 463, 482 (1988).
Nonetheless, even if not a particularly strong indication of congressional intent, it is some
indication of it.
283. I do not necessarily mean to suggest that Lockean theory requires that each individual
invention has to be analyzed to determine whether the patent reward is commensurate with the
labor invested. I make a more narrow claim that the labor theory requires the analysis of the
general field of invention to make sure that rewards are parceled out in accordance with the
nature of that field. If that is done, then the fact that occasionally a particular individual may be
over- or under-rewarded is of little consequence. My point is that in the field of genetic research
where a large (and perhaps overwhelming) amount of labor goes unrewarded (because it is
directed at discovering fundamental truths), rewarding the last and perhaps least laborintensive step with the entirety of the patent rights is asymmetrical and should be done
cautiously, if at all. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the
Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1157, 1159-60 (2004) ("For centuries, patent law has
sought to reconcile a fair scope of protection for inventors with certainty for the public
regarding the limits of patent rights and the consequent scope of the public domain. Protection
must be commensurate with inventors' Just merits,' but also must neither deprive the world of
improvements nor retard the progress of the arts." (footnote omitted».
284. See HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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erudition, [and] talents" of others-those who actually discovered the locus
and the function of the gene.285
Nor is it clear whether permitting patenting of isolated and purified
DNA is, on balance, economically advantageous-i.e., utilitarian-consistent.
Again, the research is costly and important for basic science, as well as for
therapeutic and diagnostic advances. Furthermore, by applying for a patent
on isolated DNA, the patentees are required to disclose the actual genetic
sequence of that DNA.286 This disclosure benefits the scientific community
and the public at large as it saves on the need for each subsequent
researcher to spend time and resources on sequencing and isolating the
same gene. At the same time, patents are an exclusive grant of right not just
to sell, but to use. 28 7 An exclusive right to use the entire isolated gene
irrespective of the purposes of the use 288 may preclude or at least slow down
further genetic research. Such a preclusion or a slow-down would be
tremendously detrimental to science and to the public. It goes without
saying that all patents to some extent create roadblocks for others
attempting to work in the same field,289 but although they may close one
avenue, they encourage competitors to "design around" the patent.2 90 This
"competition benefit" is beneficial because the substitutes thus produced

285. For example, the people who sequenced BRCAI and BRCA2 were not the people who
initially localized those genes. Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Bryson, j.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Jeff M. Hall et aI., Linkage oj Early-Onset
Familial Breast Cancer to Chromosome I 7q2 I, 250 SCIENCE 1684 (1990», vacated sub nom. Myriad
III, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
286. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) ("The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention."); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801-.807 (2012)
(requiring applicants for patents on biological materials to deposit such material in an
acceptable public depository).
287. 35 U.S.c. § 271 (a) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
288. Under the Patent Act it does not matter that the use is not the one for which a
patented device was intended. Any use of a patented device is infringement, whether or not
such use itself is novel or was contemplated by the patent holder. See Paragon Solutions, LLC v.
Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("Absent an express limitation to the
contrary, any use of a device that meets all of the limitations of an apparatus claim written in
structural terms infringes that apparatus claim.").
289. Katherine j. Strandburg et aI., Law and the Science oj Networks: An Overview and an
Application to the "Patent Explosion," 21 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1293, 1321 (2006) ("[B]ecause a
patent provides exclusive rights to practice the patented technology, patents impose costs on
society that may include not only supra-£ompetitive pricing of patented products but also
increased barriers to building upon existing technology. These barriers arise because improving
upon a patented technology may require either using the patented technology during
development or incorporating it into the improved result.").
290. See generaUy LAl'lDES & POSNER, supra note 179.
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ultimately provide a broader choice, and sometimes better goods, to the
public.' 9l In the field of genetics, however, the paradigm does not hold. One
simply cannot "design around" a patent on isolated DNA. 2 9' The genetic
sequence is what it is-it is conserved across individuals and species and
cannot be improved upon. The code in the sequence is unique, and any
attempts at a "design around" would produce a different protein, which
would not be particularly useful in studying the target protein.'93 In the area
of genetics then, the public is not getting the competition benefit of the
patent system.
The normative question is a close call. I tend to favor patent eligibility
for the isolated DNA primarily because I believe that, on balance, the
utilitarian considerations favor eligibility. Ultimately, even assuming that the
patents on isolated DNA do serve to block some research, it is probably
better to incentivize researchers to invest in and disclose the results of the
research on genetic sequences. These incentives will result in broader (if not
necessarily deeper)'94 study of the human genome, helping unlock its
secrets faster. Nonetheless, I admit that the matter is eminently debatable.
C.

THEcDNA

In many ways, all of the arguments that apply to the isolated DNA apply
to cDNA as well. However, cDNA has an even stronger (though again, by no
means indisputable) claim for patent eligibility. Unlike the isolated and
purified DNA, which has the same genetic sequence as native DNA, cDNA's
sequence of nucleotides is different. Recall that cDNA is a DNA molecule
that is transcribed from the mRNA and therefore contains only those pieces
of the gene that actually code for the target protein. Because a given gene
may be composed of over ninety percent non-coding regions, the chemical
and structural differences between cDNA and native or isolated DNA are
rather dramatic. Molecules of cDNA also have unique uses. For instance,
cDNA can be inserted into bacterial DNA in order to cause the bacteria to

291. MirandaJones, Case Note, Permanent Injunction, a Remedy by Any Other Name Is Patently
Not the Same: How eBay v. Mercexchange Affects the Patent Right of Non-Practicing Entities, 14 GEO.
MAsONL. REv. 1035,1044 (2007).
292. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption,
Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REv. 1349, 1371-72 (2011).
293. Id.
294. In other words, even assuming that these patents get asserted against scientists seeking
to work on other issues associated with a patented sequence, researchers will simply move
towards genes not yet discovered and therefore not subject to any patents. It is unclear,
however, that this ever happens. See Myriad II, 653 F'3d 1329, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating
that the patent holder does not enforce its patents against individuals merely conducting
research and instead focuses enforcement only on those that offer commercial genetic testing),
vacated sub nom. Myriad III, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). This willlike\y result in discovering the
function of genes sooner, which could in turn provide new and better diagnostic and
therapeutic options.
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produce the target protein. 295 Native or isolated DNA cannot be used for
that purpose because the bacterial cellular mechanism is incapable of
differentiating between introns and exons, and therefore if the entire gene
were inserted, the entire gene would be "read," ultimately producing a
wrong protein. 296
That said, the objections to cDNA patent eligibility (both descriptive
and normative) remain. If one were to consider only the ultimate function
of nucleic acids, then the excision of non-coding regions would be
irrelevant. What ultimately matters is the final product, and on that score
the cDNA and native DNA are identical. Focusing on the informationcarrying capacity of DNA would lead one to the conclusion that cDNA is not
different from a product of nature and therefore not patent eligible. 297
Similarly, all of the same philosophical objections to isolated DNA are
equally applicable to cDNA. The ability to "design-around" is still absent,
while the potential overcompensation of investment is still present.
Nonetheless, because cDNA has less in common with native DNA than
isolated DNA, my arguments for patent eligibility of the latter apply a
fortiori to the former.
D. ASSOCIATIONS BE1WEEN DNA SEQUENCES AND CONDITIONS OF INTEREST
It is important to remember that inventors file patent applications on

DNA not when they discover a sequence, but when they can point out what
that sequence is responsible for. Utility is a fundamental requirement of the
Patent Act. 2 98 Individuals seeking patents on genetic sequences must,
therefore, state why these sequences are useful-i.e., what they code for. 299
Once a researcher understands what a particular genetic sequence
does, he or she can screen people for the presence of the gene in question
and predict the presence or absence of its associated medical or biological
condition. The claims in these patents usually are directed to a method of
diagnosing the relevant condition by comparing the tested individual's DNA

295. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
296. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 42, at 347.
297. See Myriad 1, 702 F. Supp. 2d lSI, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), affd in part, rev'd in part, 653
F'3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Myriad III, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
29S. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
(emphasis added)).
299. Diana A. Villamil, Comment, Redefining Utility in Detennining the Patentability of DNA
Sequences, 5 J. MARsHALL REv. INTEll.. PROP. L. 23S, 255 (2006) ("The heightened utility
standard in the 2001 Guidelines effectively prohibits the patenting of DNA sequences, even as
research tools, because in order to satisfy the utility requirement, the claimed DNA sequence
must correspond to a known gene.").
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to the sequenced gene. 3OO This comparison can be done by utilizing a variety
of probes derived from either the isolated and purified DNA or cDNA.3 0l
The deleterious or health-enhancing quality of any genetic sequence
(or mutation therein) is a natural phenomenon and is in no way manmade.3°' Consequently, the association between the presence or absence of a
certain genetic sequence and any medical condition in and of itself is not
patent eligible. 303 Rather, the method of testing or treating such a condition
utilizing man-made chemicals such as isolated DNA or cDNA is patent
eligible. 304 It matters, then, how the claim is drafted. As Judge Rich wrote
more than thirty years ago, "the name of the game is the claim."30 5 If the
isolated DNA or cDNA (or its fragments) are patent eligible, then claims
directed to the methods of their use are patent eligible as well. Unlike
Prometheus, where the Court noted that the creation of metabolites was a
naturally occurring, intra-corporeal process,3 06 neither the creation of
isolated DNA or cDNA nor the hybridization of these molecules to in situ
DNA is naturally occurring.
To be sure, some of the same objections that can be raised to patenting
genetic material itself can be raised to patenting the use of that material. For
instance, patents on diagnostic use of DNA (in whatever form) are still
nearly impossible to design around.3 07 On the other hand, patents on the
method of diagnosis or treatment reward the actual work of inventing such
procedures and do not allow the inventor to propertize other people's
"[a]ttainments, erudtions, [and] talents." From the § 101 perspective, then,
patents drawn to diagnostic and therapeutic techniques utilizing man-made

300. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,710,001 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999
(filed June 7,1995).
301. See '001 Patent; '999 Patent.
302. Eli, supra note 23, at 382 ("Genetic mutations associated with a particular condition,
like a BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation and its association to breast and ovarian cancer, are caused
by nature .... [N]ature dictate[s] the significance of any person's genetic sequence, whether
wild type or mutated, and its relationship to any disease.").
303. Such associations are "[a] principle, in the abstract, [which] is a fundamental truth; an
original cause; a motive[, and] cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an
exclusive right." Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156,175 (1853); see Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,1302-05 (2012).
304. See James Bradshaw, Comment, Gene Patent Policy: Does Issuing Gene Patents Accord with
the PU1fJoses oj the US. Patent System?, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 637, 640 (2001) ("Gene patents
may also be drawn to methods of treating diseases by using particular genes or proteins. ").
305. Giles S. Rich, Extent oj Protection and Inte1fJretation oj Claims-American Perspectives, 21
INT'LREv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHTL. 497, 499 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
306. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1295.
307. If one only holds a patent on the isolated DNA, then a patent on cDNA may be a
legitimate design-around (and vice versa). However, usually the same entity will hold a patent
on both types of DNA. See, e.g., Myriad II, 653 F'3d 1329, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting
Myriad's patents and noting that Myriad holds patents on both isolated BRCA1/2 genes and
cDNA constructs for those genes), vacated sub nom. MyriadIII, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
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DNA molecules are the narrowest drawn and therefore have the highest
claim for patent eligibility.3 0B
V.

PATENTABILIlY OF GENETIC MATERIALS

Establishing patent eligibility for genetic materials is only half the battle.
Mter all, § 101 is "merely a coarse filter,"3 g and is just "[t]he first door
which must be opened on the difficult path to patentability."3 10 My
argument that man-made DNA is patent eligible does not mean that I
believe that all such applications are patentable, i.e., entitled to receive a
patent. Compliance with the novelty requirements must still be considered.
In my view, most DNA inventions fail that requirement and are therefore
not patentable.
To recapitulate, the genetic sequence itself is not patent eligible
because the sequence (whether whole or limited to coding regions only) is a
product of nature.3 l I Nor is the function of any sequence patent eligible as
such. The only inventions on which patent applications could be filed are
man-made chemical entities (either in the form of isolated DNA or eDNA),
as well as methods of using these entities. Unfortunately, given the current
state of knowledge in the field of molecular genetics, the creation of these
man-made molecules is not sufficiently inventive to traverse the nonobviousness requirements of § 103.
The methods and techniques for sequencing genes are well known and
have been so for quite some time.3 I2 As Professor John Golden points out:
0

Historically, much of the difficulty in using recombinant DNA
techniques has consisted in locating, isolating, and sequencing [of]
... the genes associated with particular proteins. However,
advances in technology and in laboratory techniques have eased
and automated much of this process, substantially routinizing a

308. Of course, such claims cannot be directed at just abstract mental processes. See Myriad II,
653 F.3d at 1355-57 (concluding that claims drawn to merely '''comparing' or 'analyzing' two
gene sequences fall outside the scope of § 101 because they claim only abstract mental
processes") .
309. Golden, sUfrra note 154, at 1059 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2011); id. at 1074
(Rader,]., providing additional views).
310. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960-62 (C.C.PA. 1979), vacated as moot, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
311. Additionally, sequences themselves may not even be novel as of 2005 when the human
genome project was completed and the results published.
312.
See, e.g., Andrew B. Dzeguze, The Devil in the Details: A Critique of KSR's Unwarranted
Reinterpretation of "Person Having Ordinary Skill," 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. 1. REv. 1,52 (2009);
Richard M. Mescher, Case Note, Best Mode Disclosure--Genetic Engineers Get Their Trade Secret and
Their Patent Too?-Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai PharnIaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, II2 S. Ct. 169 (interim ed. 1991), 18 U. DAYTON 1. REv. 177, 189 (1992).
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variety of tasks that had previously required considerable effort and
ingenuity.3 13
It is worth noting that this observation was made over ten years ago.
Needless to say, today the process is even easier and faster than it was in
2001, when Professor Golden was writing. Today, "the research community
generally considers the sequencing and mere identification of genes in
human and non-human organisms to be a routine process, which normally
does not involve any particular difficulties or require innovative activity."3 14
Isolating the DNA of interest from the surrounding DNA and purifying it is
also a routine procedure. 31 ;
Admittedly, the Federal Circuit held in In re Deuel that "the existence of
a general method of isolating cDNA or DNA molecules is essentially
irrelevant to the question whether the specific molecules themselves would
have been obvious, in the absence of other prior art that suggests the
claimed DNAs."3 16 The Deuel case, however, is now eighteen years old.3 17 The
technology of 2013 is much more advanced than the technology of 1995,
making the job of isolating, purifying, and synthesizing DNA not just routine
but automated.3 18 And since considerations of obviousness are based on the
knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed
invention,3 19 it follows that in deciding the questions of obviousness the
courts must consider the state of technology as it presently exists, not as it
may have existed at the time the Federal Circuit decided Deuel. The
technological advances combined with the completion of the human
genome project (which now makes the "reference sequence" of an entire

313. Golden, supra note 29, at 114-15 (emphasis omitted).
314. Minssen, supra note 30, at 126.
315. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d lSI, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Native DNA maybe extracted
from its cellular environment, including the associated chromosomal proteins, using any
number of well-established laboratory techniques."), affd in part, rev'd in part, 653 F·3d 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Myriad III, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012); Lee Petherbridge,
Comment, Intelligent Trips Implementation: A Strategy for Countries on the Cusp of Development, 25 U.
PA.]. INT'L ECON. L. 1133, 1166 (2004) (noting that purification protocols are "well-known").
316. InreDeuel, 51 F·3d 1552,1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
317. In fact, since the Deuel court had to consider the question of whether the claim
invention was obvious at the time the patent application was filed (i.e., in 1993), the case is
essentially twenty years old.
31S. See Andrew Chin, Artful Prior Art and the Quality of DNA Patents, 57 AlA. L. REv. 975,
1037 (2006); Golden, supra note 29, at 114-15.
319. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 5S0 F'3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("The
statutory standard requires us to decide whether the subject matter of the claimed invention
'would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person of ordinary skill in the
art to which [the subject matter of the invention] pertains.'" (alteration in original) (quoting
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006»).
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human DNA genome freely available)3 2o has seriously undermined the logic
of Deuel.
Furthermore, Deuel was decided prior to KSR The KSR Court
reaffirmed that when "there are a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions" that "lead[] to the anticipated success,"3'! the invention is obvious
because it would be "obvious to try" those solutions,322 For any particular
sequence of DNA embedded in a larger unit of DNA (such as a
chromosome), the application of "a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions" (in the forms of certain chemical treatments) would lead to the
"anticipated success" of isolating and purifying that sequence. 323
A 2009 Federal Circuit case, In re Kubin,3 2 4 is a final nail in the Deuel
coffin. In Kubin, the Federal Circuit opined that once the structure of a
target protein is known, isolating and purifying the gene coding for the
relevant protein is obvious,325 As the Kubin panel observed, "Insofar as Deuel
implies the obviousness inquiry cannot consider that the combination of the
claim's constituent elements was 'obvious to try,' the Supreme Court in KSR
unambiguously discredited that holding."3 26 Even if the molecular structure
of the target protein and the gene are both unknown, the structures
themselves are not patent eligible. No matter how much effort is expended
in identifying and sequencing these molecules, their native structure is a
product of nature. Only isolated molecules are patent eligible. However,
once the structure of a protein is known, the analysis of Kubin should apply.
To the extent then that Deuel is inconsistent with KSR and Kubin, it is no
longer good law.
The same general reasoning is applicable to cDNA. Although making
cDNA molecules is harder than merely isolating and purifying DNA, it is
likely obvious to a person skilled in the genetic arts, given the current state
of knowledge and technology,327 The major problem in synthesizing cDNA is
separating introns from exons and discarding the former while joining
together the latter. Because there is no specific signal at the border between

320. Klein & Mahoney, supra note 21, at 141 ("The Human Genome Project has brought
the free availability of reference sequences with which patients' DNA can be compared.").
321. KSRInt'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,421 (2007).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009)'
325. Id. at 1360-61.
326. Id. at 1358.
327. Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and
Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REv. 303,408 (2002) ("[AJ
molecular biologist uses a well-known method of creating a cDNA replica of the gene, which
contains only the expressed portions of the sequence (i.e., the exons)."); Amy Nelson,
Obviousness or Inventive Step as Applied to Nucleic Acid Molecules: A Global Perspective, 6 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 1,28 (2004) ("[Ilt is well-known to prepare cDNA libraries from human organs and to
randomly isolate and sequence DNAs therefrom.").
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the intron and exon regions, it is not immediately apparent where the
excision should take place. Nonetheless, the problem is not as big as it may
seem. Since the genetic code is conserved, once one knows the protein
sequence,3 28 one can reverse engineer the DNA sequence that would code
for that proteinY9
None of this is to say that sequencing, isolating, and purifying DNA or
creating cDNA molecules is easy or inexpensive, for it is neither. However,
the expenditure of time or money on a particular effort does not necessarily
make that effort inventive. For example, manufacturing hand-made
precision Swiss watches may be costly and time consuming, but that does not
make the known processes or mechanisms involved patentable. The test of
obviousness is not the cost of coming up with the product, but whether,
judged by the standards of a person with ordinary skills and knowledge in
the relevant art, the product in question is merely an obvious improvement
or variation on what is known.33
The bottom line then is that the results of the truly exploratory workthe discovery of a sequence of an existing but previously unknown gene, or
the discovery of a gene's peculiar function-are not patent eligible, for these
results simply uncover previously unknown but naturally occurring
0

328. The protein sequence and structure in and of themselves are not patent eligible for
the same reason that DNA sequence in and of itself is not patent eligible.
329. See In re Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1354. To be sure, because the genetic code is degenerate,
there will be several potential DNA sequences able to code for the protein that can be reverse
engineered. Nonetheless, since the potential cDNA constructs can be compared to the naturally
occurring DNA sequence (either through hybridization experiments or by comparing the
cDNA sequences to the publicly available sequences), the most "correct" version of cDNA can
be selected.
330. There is one caveat to the above discussion. Some DNA that is created in the
laboratory may not have the same sequence as is present in native DNA (whether one counts
introns or not). In other words, laboratory-created DNA may be such that it does not code for
any naturally occurring protein and therefore does not replicate naturally occurring DNA in
either sequence or structure. See Andrew W. Torrance, Synthesizing Law for Synthetic Biologj, 11
MINN.J.L. SCI. & TECH. 629, 635 (2010); Dan Luo, Creating Novel, DNA-Based Synthetic Materials,
VIVO, http://vivo.comell.edu/ display/individuah 6724 (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
These constructs may have a variety of uses, from creating new organisms, see, e.g.,
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), to "providing an efficient method for avoiding
genetic diseases and optimizing desirable characteristics." Andrew W. Torrance, Family Law and
the Genomic Revolution, 79 UMKC L. REv. 271, 281 (2010). Engineering these synthetic DNA
molecules involves significantly more creative work than merely isolating and puritying
naturally occurring sequences out of a larger molecule. Nor is it simply reverse engineering
DNA from a protein sequence utilizing known solutions to achieve a predictable result. Rather,
synthetic DNA would involve creating a new gene, instead of replicating (and chemically
moditying) an existing but previously unknown gene. This difference should result in a different
outcome on the issue of obviousness. Whereas an existing but unknown gene can be sequenced
and then purified, isolated, and modified using known methods and "predictable solutions,"
creation of a synthetic gene has no template and, therefore, no solutions that are "predictable."
Indeed, these molecules are so without analogue in nature that some have suggested that they
ought to be eligible for copyright protection. See id.
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properties and phenomena. On the other hand, the work that artificially
creates a gene and "control[s] the force [of nature] as to make it accomplish
the [therapeutic and diagnostic] purpose[s]" and produces "new thing[s]
commercially and therapeutically," is not sufficiently inventive to be
patentable. 331 Thus, patents and patent applications on genetic material (at
least to the extent that they represent naturally occurring genes) should fail
either under § 101 or § 103 of the Patent Act, leaving researchers and
investors in this technology without any protection. Given the high cost of
research and the comparatively low cost of copying in this area, a lack of
patent protections would disincetivize further investments into genetic
research. This, of course, would be detrimental to the public as a whole.
Therefore, an alternative mechanism for incentivizing investment and
spurring genetic research is needed. In the next Part I will discuss a
currently existing system for non-patent-based exclusive rights that can serve
as a model for non-patent-based protection for the fruits of genetic research.
VI. FDA-ADMINISTERED EXCLUSIVE REGIMES FOR PHARMACEUTICALS AND
BIOLOGICS
In designing an alternative to the patent system for genetic materials,
two things are important to bear in mind. First, a patent does not confer any
right to use the patented technology.33 2 The only right that a patent confers
on the patentee is a right to exclude others from using (or selling) the
patented technology.333 Thus, for instance, a pharmaceutical company may
acquire a patent on a new drug but never be able to market it if the drug
fails the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")approval process. 334 Second
(and directly related to the preceding point), patents themselves are
worthless unless the patented technology can be practiced and is sufficiently
profitable. 335 In other words, "The present value of an invention without a
current or foreseeable use is nothing."33 6

331. See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
332. See Jonah D. Jackson, Note, Something Like the Sun: Why Even "Isolated and Purified" Genes
Are Still Products of Nature, 89 TEX. L. REv. 1453, 1487 (2011).
333. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see al50Jackson, supra note 332, at 1487.
334. Katherine N. Addison, The Impact of the Biosimilars Provision of the Heath Care Reform Bill
on Innovation Investments, IOJ. MARSHALL REv. INTELL. PROP. L. 553, 571 (2011).
335. John F. DuffY, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, jacksonian Realism, and the
Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 1071, 1141 (2000) ("If a patent is issued for a

technological loser, the patent is worthless."). In fact, most patents turn out to be worthless,
because the patented technology is of no interest to the public or the competitors. See, e.g.,
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1497 (2001);
Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1521 (2005); Glen O. Robinson,
Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1449, 1495 (2004) ("It is regularly observed that
most patents-the form of intellectual property most commonly associated with monopoly-are
economically worthless .... ").
336. Machin, supra note 176, at 438.
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Patents on genetic materials are valuable because they read on
approved and marketable therapeutic or diagnostic technologies. Thus, the
greatest return on investment for genetic research comes at the market-entry
stage and not at the patenting stage. If a certain technology requires permits
or pre-approval to enter the market, the agency that controls the permitting
process can also ensure necessary periods of exclusivity. With respect to
DNA, such a system can be administered by an existing federal agency-the
FDA.
Before any pharmaceutical manufacturer can sell its wares in the
United States, it must obtain the FDA's pre-market approval. 33i In order to
obtain such approval, the manufacturer must prove to the FDA that the drug
in question is both safe for use and effective for the claimed purpose.s 38 The
same requirement applies to medical devices. 33g A similar, though not
identical, process 340 is followed by manufacturers seeking approval for
"biological products" or "biologics."34' Thus, the FDA serves as a gatekeeper
to the market for the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals and biologics. If the
FDA could reject applications on economic or competition-promoting
grounds, rather than only on safety and efficacy grounds, manufacturers of
relevant products could seek protection under the FDA's regime rather than
(or in addition to) the patent regime.
As it happens, for most pharmaceuticals and some biologic products,
such a regime is already in place. The FDA does indeed have authority to
limit market entry by copyists, even if their products satisfy the "safe and

337.
338.
339.
340.
approval

21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
Id. § 355(d).
Id. § 360e (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
For a discussion of differences between the history, the governing law, and the
processes, see generally John A. Vernon, Alan Bennett &Joseph H. Golec, Exploration

of Potential Economics of Follow-On Biologics and Implications for Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics,
16 B.U.]. SCI. & TECH. L. 55 (2010).

341. Biologics are defined as "any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, or analogous
product applicable to the prevention, treatment or cure of diseases or injuries of man." 21
C.F.R. § 600'3(h) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 262 (i) (I) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (defining
biological products). As the FDA explains:
Biological products include a wide range of products such as vaccines, blood and
blood components, allergenics, somatic cells, gene therapy, tissues, and
recombinant therapeutic proteins. Biologics can be composed of sugars, proteins,
or nucleic acids or complex combinations of these substances, or may be living
entities such as cells and tissues.
Biologics are isolated from a variety of natural sources-human, animal, or
microorganism-and may be produced by biotechnology methods and other
cutting-edge technologies. Gene-based and cellular biologics, for example, often
are at the forefront of biomedical research, and may be used to treat a variety of
medical conditions for which no other treatments are available.

REsources for You (Biologics), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fdagov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
ResourcesforYou/default.htrn (last updated May II, 2010).
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efficacious" requirements. I will first describe the two systems and then
explain how they could be expanded to cover genetic materials and what
benefits would accrue from such an expansion.
A.

NEW CHEMICAL ENTITIES UNDER THE HATCH- WAXMAN ACT

Several different types of market exclusivity are available to
manufacturers of pharmaceutical products. 342 One such type of exclusivity
protects "new chemical entities."343 This provision was created in 1984 by
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984344
(commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act) .345
The "new chemical entity" ("NCE") exclusivity provision is aimed at
protecting pioneering manufacturers from premature competition by
generic (or copying) manufacturers. 346 When a pioneering drug
manufacturer seeks to market a new pharmaceutical, it must submit '''full
reports of investigations' made 'to show whether or not such drug is safe for
use and whether such drug is effective in use. "'347 The clinical studies
necessary to compile such reports are both long and expensive. 348 Prior to
1984, any competitor that wished to enter the market, even if attempting to
supply a generic (and therefore identical) version of a previously approved
drug, needed to conduct its own "extensive (and expensive)"349 studies to
prove something that was already known to the FDA.35 "Due to the lack of
finances to undertake the expensive process of clinical studies to prove a
0

342. Alice O. Martin & Sendil K Devadas, Patents with an "[" = Patients, 18 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 261,265 (2009).
343. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (3) (E)(ii) (creating exclusivity for drugs whose active ingredient
has never been used in another drug previously submitted for approval).
344. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. § 355 and 35 U.S.c. § 271 (e) (2006 &
Supp. V 2011)).
345. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE]. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS
717,727 (2005) ("In 1984, Congress added two more provisions for FDA-administered market
exclusivity in the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly
known as the 'Hatch-Waxman Act."').
346. See Kathleen R. Kelleher, Note, FDA Approval of Generic Biologics: Finding a Reg;ulatory
Pathway, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 245, 255-56 (2007) (discussing how NCE
exclusivity is meant to incentivize pioneering research in pharmaceuticals).
347. Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting 21
U.S.C. § 355(b)(l) (1994))·
348. Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats,
23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 159, 184 (2006) ("These clinical studies
frequently involve hundreds of subjects, and may cost tens of millions of dollars (or more)
each."); Anne-Marie C. Yvon, Settlements Between Brand and Generic Pharmaceutical Companies: A
Reasonable Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payments, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1883, 1894 (2006)
(recognizing that clinical studies are "extensive (and expensive)").
349. Yvon, supra note 348, at 1894.
350. Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARv.].L. & TECH. 281,
287 (2011).
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drug was safe and effective, few generic drugs entered the market .... "35 1
The Hatch-Waxman Act solved the problem by creating
a new process called the Abbreviated New Drug Application
("ANDA") whereby a manufacturer of a generic drug can certify
that the drug it seeks to market is bioequivalent to a drug that has
already been approved by the FDA. This process obviates the need
for the manufacturer of the generic drugs to run duplicative tests
to show, for the second time, that its drug is safe and efficacious.35 2
Instead of conducting its own clinical trials, an ANDA filer is permitted to
rely on data gathered by the pioneer drug-makef.3 53
At the same time that the Hatch-Waxman Act was making life easier for
generic manufacturers, it also sought to maintain the balance between
competition and innovation. 354 Specifically, it limited the FDA's freedom to
approve ANDA applications that relied on the pioneer drug manufacturer's
data. Under the Act, the FDA cannot approve an ANDA within five years of
approving a pioneer application if the pioneer application involved a new
active ingredient. This restriction is known as a "new chemical entity"
exclusivity.355 Although usually a new active ingredient is also covered by a
relevant patent,356 this statutory exclusivity provision is available "even if the
underlying product was unpatented or off-patent,"357 and "even if the patent
that protects an NeE is invalid."35 8
Technically, the exclusivity provision only applies when the generic
manufacturer wishes to rely on the pioneer's data. Should the generic wish
to conduct its own clinical trials, and submit its own new drug application,
the Hatch-Waxman exclusivity provisions would not stand in the way of
approval. 359 However, conducting duplicative clinical studies is expensive,

351.
NOvAL.
352.
353.

Sarah M. Yoho, Note, Reformation of the Hatch-Waxman Act, an Unnecessary Resolution, 27
REv. 527,531 (2003).
Dolin, supra note 350, at 288 (footnote omitted).
Sheila Kadura, Note, Is an Absolute Ban on Reverse Payments the Appropriate Way to Prevent
Anticompetitive Agreements Between Branded- and Generic-Pharmaceutical Companies?, 86 TEX. L. REv.
647,651 (2008).
354. Dolin, supra note 350, at 289 ("To counter-balance the benefit conferred on the
generics, and to continue to promote the development of pioneer drugs, Congress enacted
rules, as part of the Hatch-Waxman Act, that were meant to benefit brand-name
manufacturers.") .
355. Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History,
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST LJ. 585,592-93 (2003).
356. Id. at 593 ("NCE exclusivity usually overlaps with the patent term .... ").
357. Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and
Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 306 (2008).
358. James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of I984, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 433,465 (1986).
359. 21 U.S.c. § 355(c) (3) (E) (ii)-(iii) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Of course, to the extent
that the pioneer drug is covered by a patent, the generic would not be permitted to sell its own
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and the return on such studies would be lower than the monopoly rents that
a single provider could charge. 36o Therefore, generic manufacturers do not
undertake such studies, and data-based exclusivity is sufficient to protect the
interests of the pioneering manufacturer.
B.

BIOLOGICS UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT

A similar exclusivity provision exists for biologic products. In 2010, as
part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Congress passed,
and President Obama signed, the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act of 2009 ("BPCIA").3 61 The BPCIA applies not to every
biologic product, but only to those products that are classified as such under
the Public Health Service Act of 1944 ("PHSA").3 62 Under that Act, "[t]he
term 'biological product' means a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin,
vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product ... or
analogous product ... applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a
disease or condition of human beings."3 63 By its terms the BPCIA does not
include genetic materials-proteins, lipids, etc.-as such.3 64
Much like the Hatch-Waxman Act, the BPCIA seeks both to increase the
availability of generic biologics and to protect pioneering manufacturers.
The BPCIA opened up an avenue for the manufacturers of biological
products to rely on pioneer manufacturers' safety and efficacy studies in
getting biosimilar365 products on the market. Under the BPCIA, however,
the pioneering biologic gets not five, but twelve years 366 of exclusivity.3 67

version. 35' U.S.C. § 271 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also Eisenberg, supra note 345, at 727-28
('The five-year period of exclusivity for new chemical entities ... does not prevent a competitor
from obtaining approval of an unpatented product if it is willing to go to the trouble and
expense of conducting its own clinical trials and to rely strictly on its own data for proof of
safety and efficacy.").
360. Rantanen, supra note 348, at 184.
361. Patient Protection and Mfordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. I I 1-148, §§ 7001-7002, 124
Stat. 119,804-21 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 262 (2006 & Supp. V 2011».
362. Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300).
363. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(I).
364. All of the above materials could be part of "a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin,
vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, ... or analogous product,"
see What Are "Biologics" Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.
fda.gov/ AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicaiProductsandTobacco/ CBER/ ucm 1330jj .htm
(last updated Apr. 30, 2009), but they are not in and of themselves considered to be "biological
products."
365. "Biosimilar" is a generic version ofa pioneering biologic. Under the BPCIA, a product
is "biosimilar" if it is "(A) ... [a] biological product [that] is highly similar to the reference
product notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive components; and (B) there are
no clinically meaningful differences between the biological product and the reference product
in terms of the safety, purity, and potency of the product." 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2) (A)-(B).
366. This can be extended by an additional six months if pediatric studies are conducted.
!d. § 262(m)(2)(A).
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Much like with Hatch-Waxman exclusivity, these provisions do not apply to
the manufacturers of biosimilars that undertake their own studies and
submit their own original application for approval.3 68

C.

APPLYING THE CURRENT MARKET EXCLUSIVITY PROVISIONS TO
PHARMACEUTICALS

In determining whether the exclusivity provisions apply with respect to
pharmaceuticals, the FDA follows a fairly straightforward rule. If the active
ingredient369 in the drug has never been previously approved (whether as
part of the same or other drug),37 the exclusivity provisions apply. The
active ingredient is considered "new" even if the advance is minor and of the
kind that would fail the non-obviousness requirement of the Patent Act.37 1
With respect to biologics, the rules are very similar, except that the FDA is
prohibited from approving not just identical copies of biologics but also
molecules that are "biosimilar" to or "interchangeable"37 2 with approved
biologics. 373 Unlike the patent examination process, in which the Patent
Office examines the application for compliance with, inter alia, novelty
requirements, the FDA does not engage in such an analysis. Instead, all the
FDA determines is whether the pioneering biologic which is serving as a
"reference product" for the generic application has been first approved for
use within the last twelve years. 374 If so, the FDA does not undertake any
further evaluation and simply declines to act on the generic's application.
In summary, the current FDA exclusivity process has two distinct
features that make it easy to administer on one hand but easy (though
incredibly expensive and therefore often financially infeasible) to
circumvent on the other. It is easy to administer because the FDA does not
engage in any significant novelty inquiry prior to conferring the relevant
exclusivity benefit. It is easy to circumvent because the exclusivity is triggered
0

367. Id. § 262(k)(7) (A).
36S. See Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exciusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals-Do We
Really Need Both?, IS MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 419, 440 (2012).
369. An "active ingredient" is "any component that is intended to furnish pharmacological
activity or other direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals." 21
C.F.R. § 2 10·3 (b)(7) (2012).
370. It does not matter whether the chemical entity has been known or for how long. The
question for the purposes of exclusivity is not whether the NCE is newly discovered but whether
it has been previously approved for use. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.loS(a).
371. See Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in Inttmlational
Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. I,
39-40 ( 200 9).
372. See 42 U.S.c. § 262(i) (3) (defining interchangeability as the ability of "the biological
product [to] be substituted for the reference product without the intervention of the health
care provider who prescribed the reference product").
373. Seeid. § 262(k)(6).
374. Id. § 262(i)(4) (defining "reference product").
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only when the generic files an abbreviated application that relies on the
pioneer's data. If the generic chooses to conduct its own safety and efficacy
studies, then FDA's exclusivity provisions present no barriers to entry. The
only barriers that would remain in that situation are patent protections and
the cost of conducting independent studies.
This system serves as a useful but incomplete template for a system of
FDA-based protections of inventions in the field of genetics that I propose
below. My proposed system attempts to minimize the system's administrative
burden while addressing the ease of evading the present FDA-based statutory
exclusivity regime.

VII.

FDA-ADMINISTERED EXCLUSIVE REGIME FOR GENETIC MATERIALS

As preceding sections show, a system for market exclusivity for the fruits
of research in genetics has to satisfy several criteria. First, it has to provide
sufficient protection to incentivize investment and innovation in the area.
Second, the system ought not replicate all of the shortcomings of the patent
system-it should not be a stumbling block for further research and
inventing around the protected products. Nor should it overcompensate for
the amount of labor invested by bestowing protections that go beyond
rewarding the actual inventions (as opposed to discoveries) made. To say it
another way, the non-pate nt-based system must accomplish its ends without
withdrawing a significant amount of knowledge from the commons. Third,
the system should be relatively easy to administer, permitting the relevant
regulatory agency to approve or deny applications quickly and not replicate
the interminable patent prosecution processes. 375 Fourth, there must be no
easy and inexpensive way to evade the non-pate nt-based exclusivity. With
these requirements in mind, I will now turn to the proposal for an
alternative, non-pate nt-based system of protecting genetic research.
A.

THE SYSTEM DESIGN

As an initial matter, in order to create a system capable of protecting
genetic inventions, the definition of a "biological product" or "biologic" in
the PHSA must be expanded. Currently, biologics are only defined as any
"virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component
or derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically synthesized
polypeptide), or analogous product ... applicable to the prevention,
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings."37 6 Although
the FDA recognizes that nucleic acids can form a component of a biological
3 7 5· Enrique Seoane-Vazquez et aI., Analysis of the Impact of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
on Pharmaceutical Patents, 54 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 171, 178 (2009) ("This study estimated that the
average prosecution time of NME patents exceeded five years."). "NME" is a "new molecular
entity," which the article defines as a "new drug containing an active substance that has never
before been approved for marketing in the United States." Id. at 173.
375. 42 U.S.C. § 252(i)(I).
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product,377 stand-alone nucleic acids are not considered to be "biologics" for
the purposes of the PHSA.378
With respect to DNA-based treatments, if the definitions of the "biologic
material" in the PHSA were broadened to include "nucleic acids" as such,
then these treatments would come within the protections of the BPCIA. In
order to get approval as a treatment, an individual seeking a biologic license
on a DNA molecule would have to conduct clinical studies to show that that
treatment is safe and effective for the relevant condition. 379 The protections
offered by the BPCIA's data-exclusivity provisions would likely be enough for
inventors seeking protection for DNA-based therapies.
Of course, nucleic acids can be used not only to treat disease, but also
to diagnose various conditions as wel1.3 80 Indeed, diagnostics is the primary
use of genetic materials today as gene therapy is still experimental and
rare.3 81 But currently, under BPCIA, unless a biological product is meant for
the "prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition," it is not
subject to the approval mechanism through the biologic license application.
Thus, merely diagnostic tests do not fit within the PHSAjBPCIA framework.
In order to provide a full measure of protection for genetic research, the
biologic definition needs to be expanded to include not only biological
products of which a nucleic acid is a component, but also nucleic acids
themselves. Further, the statute must be expanded to cover products meant
not only for "the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition,"
but also ones meant for diagnosing such diseases or conditions. By so
expanding the coverage of the PHSA, the FDA will be given authority to
approve or disapprove applications for the use of genetic materials in the
treatment, prevention, or the diagnosis of a disease.
Explicitly providing the FDA with authority to regulate genetic material
meant to treat or diagnose any disease would be but a mild expansion of the

377. See supra note 341. This recognition is not surprising. For instance, a virus is an
organism that consists of only a nucleic acid (either DNA or RNA) and a protein "housing" that
envelops the genetic material. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1939 (MaIjory Spraycar et
al. eds., 26th ed. 1995). Some viruses also have a further lipid "envelope." Thus, of necessity, a
virus includes nucleic acids as a component.
378. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(I).
379. See Letter from Kathryn C. Zoon, Dir., Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research, to
Sponsors/Researchers, Human Cells Used in Therapy Involving the Transfer of Genetic
Material by Means Other than the Union of Gamete Nuclei Guly 6, 2001), available at
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/ucml05852.htm.
380. See Myriad 1,702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), altd in part, rev'd in part,
653 F·3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. MyriadlIJ, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
381. Gene Therapy, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFO., http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/
Human_Genome/medicine/genetherapy.shtml (last updated Aug. 24, 2011) ("The Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) has not yet approved any human gene therapy product for sale.
Current gene therapy is experimental and has not proven very successful in clinical trials. Little
progress has been made since the first gene therapy clinical trial began in 1990.").
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FDA's regulatory authority. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act already
permits the FDA to regulate medical devices,3 82 and defines a "device" as
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance,
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article,
including any component, part, or accessory, which is ... intended
for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease ... and which
does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical
action within or on the body.3 83
All devices are classified as a Class I, II, or III device3 84 based on the level
of danger they may present to a consumer,3 85 with Class I being the least and
Class III the most potentially dangerous. Class III devices are subject to premarket approval,3 86 whereas Class I devices are not.3 87 Class II devices are
subject to "pre-market notification,"3 88 a process in which the FDA evaluates
whether the device is similar to an already approved and safe device 389 and,
if not, whether it poses sufficient danger to be classified as Class III.39
Although Class I is exempt from pre-market approval or notification,
only those devices that are shown to be safe and effective whenever not
adulterated or misbranded qualify for this designation. 391 According to the
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation
by Dr. Jeffrey Shuren, most genetic tests are considered to be either a Class
II or a Class III device.39 2 Thus, the FDA already has the authority to regulate
most genetic materials meant to test for a particular trait or disease. 393 The
FDA, however, has refrained from regulating "test[s] by a laboratory for use
0

382. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006).
383. Id·§3 21 (h).
384. Id. § 360C.
385. Michael D. Green & William B. Schultz, Tort Law Deference to HJA Regulation of Medical
Devices, 88 GEO. LJ. 2119, 2131 (2000).
386. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
387. Id. § 360c(a)(1) (A).
388. Id. § 360c(a)( 1) (B).
389. Yann Joly et aI., Regulatory Approval for New Pharmacogenomic Tests: A Comparative
Overview, 66 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 1, 13 (2011); Annie Marie Murphy, Note, The Biomatcrials Access
Assurance Act of I998 and Supplier Liability: Who You Gonna Sue?, 25 DEL.]. CORP. L. 715,726-27
(2000).
390. SeeJoly et aI., supra note 389, at 13.
391. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (I )(A). A classic example of such a device is a home pregnancy
test that does not present significant danger to human health and safety even if it
"malfunctions." See Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing and the Consequences to the Public: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, III th Congo 4 (2010) [hereinafter Shurenl
(statement of Jeffrey Shuren, Director, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Food and
Drug Administration) ("An example of a Class I test is a luteinizing hormone test that, if it gives
a false result, may lead to delayed conception but is unlikely to directly harm the patient.").
39 2 . Shuren, supra note 391, at 4, 7.
393· Id. at 7·
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only by that laboratory,"394 which is how much genetic testing is done. In
other words, if a sample of a patient's DNA is sent to the laboratory for
processing using the test developed by that very laboratory, the FDA is not
involved in approving such tests.395 Nonetheless, the FDA is considering
exercising its authority over these laboratory-developed tests as wel\39 6
because it has observed a number of problems with them, including
"[f1aulty data analysis"; "[e]xaggerated clinical claims"; "[f1raudulent data";
"[l]ack of traceability/change control"; "[p]oor clinical study design"; and
"[ u] nacceptable clinical performance. "397
The only potential expansion of the FDA's existing regulatory authority
would thus come from requiring pre-market approval for those genetic
materials that may now be classified as Class I devices. Most genetic tests do
not fall into that category, however, making the expansion rather small.398
Further, I am not suggesting a more searching examination of the genetic
materials currently classed as Class I or Class II devices. If the genetic
material or test kit is not dangerous, or if a potential erroneous test result
using that material "is unlikely to directly harm the patient,"399 there is no
reason to require extensive and expensive studies to prove the obvious.
Similarly, if the genetic material or test kit in its general (though not
specific) function is similar to a previously approved test, or if it is not
sufficiently dangerous to the patient to be classified as a Class III device,
there is no reason to insist on complying with procedures established for
Class III devices as such compliance would serve no useful purpose. Instead,
all that I am suggesting is the requirement of obtaining an FDA license (like
with every other biological product) prior to entering the market. The
license itself, however, need not be predicated on clinical studies if such
studies are not necessary to assure patients' safety.
The authority to regulate genetic materials can be harnessed to create
preferential market entry conditions for the first inventors, while restricting
entry to the second-comers. Presently, the FDA approves genetic materials

394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 9 ("The Agency is now engaging in a public dialogue on how it should develop a
consistent, reasonable, and fair approach to all genetic tests, whether packaged as kits or
provided as [laboratory developed tests], to ensure safety and promote innovation.").
397. Id. at 8.
398. See Shuren, supra note 391; Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen A. O'Rourke, A False
Start? The Impact oj Federal Policy on the Genotechnology Industry, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 163, 206
(1996) ("Because of their complexity, genetics-based diagnostics generally are labelled Class III
devices."). But see Bruce Patsner, New "Home Brew" Predictive Genetic Tests Present Si[!;T!ificant
Re[!;T!latory Problems, 9 HOus.J. HEALTH L. & POL'y 237,247 (2009) ("[Bly federal rule almost all
such predictive genetic tests are not Class III devices but rather are classified as either Class I or
Class II devices .... ").
399. Shuren, supra note 391.
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for market entry once they are shown to be safe and effective 400 without
regard to the novelty of the product. If, in addition, genetic materials were
reclassified not just as "medical devices" but also as "biological products,"
then the exclusivity provisions of BPCIA would come into play and preclude
later filers (who choose to rely on the pioneer's data) from obtaining
approval. With this re-classification (or rather "double classification") the
amount of regulatory activity by the FDA would not increase, but the value
of gaining the FDA approval for the first filer would.
To make the proposed exclusivity system for genetic materials effective,
an additional change in the law would need to be made. That change stems
from the recognition that current exclusivity provisions are triggered only
when the subsequent filer attempts to rely on a pioneer's data. To the extent
that a new filer wishes to conduct his own safety and efficacy studies, the
exclusivity provisions are not a barrier to market entry. Exclusivity provisions
are effective because most safety and efficacy studies are costly and the
return on investment in these studies diminishes with every subsequent
market entrant. However, genetic materials or test kits that fall into the Class
I or Class II device category do not have to go through extensive and costly
clinical trials before gaining permission to enter the market. Thus,
exclusivity provisions based on access to (or use of) the pioneer's data would
not serve as a sufficient barrier to entry for later filers. Consequently, a new
type of provision that would provide sufficient protections for biological
products of all classes (whether subject to extensive pre-approval clinical
studies or not) must be designed. The exclusivity should be based not on the
pioneer's data, but on the pioneer's product.
Recall that genetic tests are conducted by finding out whether the
patient's DNA hybridizes (i.e., "matches") the test strand of DNA. This
match can occur because of the complementary nature of DNA's two
strands. When researchers discover and sequence a new gene under the
present regime, they can patent laboratory-produced, isolated, and purified
complementary strands and then use these isolated strands to test patients
for this newly discovered gene (and therefore any medical condition
associated with that gene). Under my proposal, when a manufacturer of a
new genetic test seeks FDA approval, the FDA would evaluate the application
to see whether DNA with the same or similar sequence has been previously
approved. The "similarity" would be judged not on the "obviousness"
standard of the Patent Act's § 103, but rather in a more straightforward way.
If the later filer's molecule has the same or highly similar (e.g., within ninety
percent identical) hybridization properties as the pioneer's molecule, then
the later filer's molecule would be deemed sufficiently "similar" and,
therefore, subject to the exclusivity bar. This would be true irrespective of

400.
The requirements for that showing may differ from Class I to Class III devices, but the
standard of safety and efficacy is the same for all devices.
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whether the later filer had (or even needed) his own data to support the
safety and efficacy of the genetic material or test kit that he seeks to market.
This approach would be similar to the exclusivity now available to the
developers of "orphan drugs" (i.e., drugs developed to treat a rare
disease) .40 1
Though under my proposal the exclusive rights would be broader than
the current data-based provisions in the BPCIA, they would be, in several
respects, more limited than patent-based rights to exclude. First, and most
obvious, the exclusivity obtained through the FDA licensing scheme, unlike
that obtained via a patent, would not apply to every "use" of the product.
Instead, FDA-based exclusivity would apply only to products being
(1) marketed to patients (either directly or through a healthcare provider)
and (2) "intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or
in the cure, mltIgation, treatment, or prevention of disease."4 02
Consequently, the gene itself, whether in native, isolated and purified, or
cDNA form, would remain available for use in research and development of
new treatments or diagnostics. Such use of a gene would not be subject to
FDA regulation because it would not be marketed to patients and would not
be used for "the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease."4 3
Second, unlike the Patent Act, my proposal would require that FDAgranted exclusivity include a "use it or lose it" provision similar to the one
present in the amended Hatch-Waxman Act.40 4 Patent law permits a
patentee not to practice the invention and instead merely to seek to license
the patent to others who do practice it.4 5 There is, of course, nothing wrong
with that practice in principle, as it allows inventors who are not necessarily
able to manufacture the invention themselves to monetize their inventions.
However, the FDA-based exclusivity provisions should serve as a spur not just
to innovate and disclose information, but to bring products to marketproducts that may be costly and laborious to develop but that are not
necessarily innovative because they are obvious to one of ordinary skill in the
art of molecular genetics. It would make little sense then to allow the
beneficiary of the provision intended to ensure availability of certain
products on the market, to not actually bring the approved product to (or to
prematurely withdraw from) the market.
0

0

401. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (2006) (granting exclusivity to the first person to bring an
orphan drug to market). For a full definition of "orphan drug," see id. § 360bb(a).
402. ld.§3 21 (h)(2).
403. [d.
404. [d. § 355 (j)(5)(D)(i) (I).
405. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane)
("There is no requirement in this country that a patentee make, use, or sell its patented
invention.") .
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The third distinction from patent law that the system ought to have is
varying lengths of exclusivity. Under the Patent Act (and pursuant to the
international agreements) the length of patent terms on all inventions,
irrespective of their field, must be twenty years from the date of filing the
patent application.406 This approach has been criticized by a number of
commentators as constricting the design of optimal innovation incentives.407
Nonetheless, if for no other reason than the obligation to adhere to our
international agreements, the patent system cannot vary the patent term's
length depending on the social utility of the innovation or the measure of its
advance over the prior art. No such restrictions, however, apply to a nonpatent-based grant of exclusive rights. As a result, in designing a system of
FDA-based exclusive rights, different terms could be assigned to inventions
depending on the value of each class of invention. Indeed, such
differentiation is already present in the FDA's approval process. As I
discussed in Part VII, the exclusivity period for new chemical entities is only
5 years, whereas the exclusivity periods on biologics is 12 years, and other
provisions in the Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act provide for exclusivity
provisions of 180 days for the first generic drug on the market4 08 and 7 years
for "orphan drugs.''4 09 Thus, exclusivity provisions of different lengths are
nothing new to the FDA.
A good departure point for genetic tests would be whether the
particular application would seek approval as a Class I, II, or III device. The
more complicated the test, or the more problematic an incorrect test result
would present, the more likely that detailed studies proving safety and
efficacy would be required and the more refined the ultimate product would
have to be. These complex materials would be eligible for the longest
exclusivity period. The easier the test, and the fewer problems an erroneous
result would present, the more likely the product could be approved without
extensive studies, and therefore the more likely it is that the product would
not be as refined. These simpler products ought to receive the shortest
exclusivity provisions. While I do not have particularly strong views on the
length of each exclusivity provision, I would suggest taking the effective life
of an average pharmaceutical patent410 as a benchmark for the longest
406. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006); World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 November 2001,41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
407. See, e.g., Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. LJ. 269, 292-93 (2006); Amir H. Khoury, Differential Patent Tenns and the
Commercial Capacity of Innovation, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. LJ. 373,405-12 (2010); Frank Partnoy,
Finance and Patent Length 27-38 (Univ. of San Diego, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 19,
2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=285144.
408. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(8)(iv) (2006 & Supp. V 20 II).
409. Id. § 360cc(a) (2006).
410. Wheaton, supra note 358, at 451 ("In the context of the pharmaceutical industry, the
term 'effective patent life' describes the period between FDA approval of a patented drug
product and the expiration of that product's patent.").
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exclusivity period. Under such a system, the maximal FDA-based market
exclusivity provisions would last about 11.5 to 12 years,4l1 On the opposite
end, the minimal exclusivity length would be about 3.5 to 4 years, which
would correspond to the time frame when first patent maintenance fees
would be due if the exclusivity were obtained under a patent-based system. 412
The mid-level of protection would be set at about 7.5 to 8 years of exclusive
rights, which would correspond to the due date for the second patent
maintenance fee. 413 It makes sense to tie the exclusivity provisions to patent
maintenance fee dates because patent maintenance fees serve as a
mechanism to terminate patents without value.4'4 It is true, of course, that a
patent may present but a minor improvement and yet be very economically
valuable, and vice versa. In that sense, the analogy of the exclusivity periods
in my proposed system to the payment of maintenance fees in the patent
system is not perfect. Nonetheless, setting periods at these lengths would
provide a rough equivalence to the length of protections offered by the
patent system. In any case, the particular length of the each exclusivity
provision is not central to my proposal. To the extent that empirical data
would show that any of these periods are suboptimal (as either too long or
too short) to achieve the desired effect of incentivizing research in the area
of molecular genetics, the length of each period ought to be adjusted. What
is central to the proposal is the ability to differentiate between the genetic
products seeking market entry and bestowing the longest exclusivity rights
only on products of sufficient complexity and sufficient advancement over
the prior art.
One final requirement necessary for the success of an FDA-based
exclusivity system is a provision precluding applicants from taking advantage
of both the patent system and the FDA system as they currently can with new
pharmaceuticals and biologics. Criticism has been leveled at the current
"double benefit" system (especially with respect to biologics) as being
overprotective of inventorS.4'5 Whether or not that criticism is fully justified,
at the very least the ability to reap both benefits could theoretically be
justified on the grounds that FDA-based exclusivity as currently constituted
only applies when the later filer seeks to use the pioneer's data. Therefore, it
41 I. Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory
Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 71, 78 (2011) ("[TJhe typical effective
patent life for phannaceuticals in the United States today is under twelve years for drugs with
more than $100 million in annual sales, which, not surprisingly, constituted 90 percent of the
unit sales in the brand market in the United States during the period from 1995 to 2005. That
effective period is even lower for some segments.").
412.

35U.S.C.§41(b} (2006&Supp.V2011).

413. [d.
414. As Mark Lemley pointed out, "nearly two-thirds of all issued patents lapse for failure to
pay maintenance fees before the end of their term: nearly half of all patents are abandoned in
this way before their term is half over." Lemley, supra note 335, at 1503.
415.

See Heled, supra note 368, at 470-75.
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could be argued, patent protections are necessary to prevent a copier from
entering the market at all (even after conducting its own safety and efficacy
studies). That argument would be unavailable in the system that I am
proposing because exclusivity would be granted based on the DNA product
itself and its hybridization properties, irrespective of who conducted the
safety and efficacy studies and whether such studies were necessary in the
first place. Consequently, additional patent protection would not be
necessary. Indeed, patent protection would serve only to potentially extend
the shorter of the exclusivity periods by allowing the patentee to tie up the
generic in costly litigation for years. Furthermore, since it is likely, based on
the analysis in Part V, that most of these patents would not survive an
obviousness analysis, such litigation would only delay the inevitable to the
detriment of consumers. As a result, my proposal would require every
applicant seeking a license to market a new genetic test or treatment to
choose between patent protection and FDA-based protection. If a patent has
already been obtained, but the applicant thinks that FDA-based exclusivity
rights would be more advantageous, the patentee would be required to
disclaim any patent term extending beyond the term of FDA-based
protection.
B.

THEJUSTlFICA TION AND BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM

A system in which the FDA preferentially treats first market entrants and
limits, for a certain amount of time, market access to later filers meets all the
criteria identified in the beginning of this Part. First, if exclusivity is granted
for a sufficient time period, the system provides adequate incentive to the
inventors-much in the same way a patent system does. Mter all, because
patent-based exclusivity becomes valuable only after market entry is made
possible, the system that provides market exclusivity simultaneously with
permission for market entry serves the same function as a patent: it permits
the holder of the exclusive right to exclude others from the market and
obtain monopoly rents on the product.4'6 Second, the FDA-based system
would not overcompensate the developers of new tests and treatment by
granting them rights to more than they actually developed. Because the
FDA-based exclusivity rights would apply only to products that are meant for
diagnosis or treatment of diseases, the innovator would not be getting
exclusive rights to all uses of a gene (in whatever form). This restriction

416.

See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9 N.Y.V.].

LEGIS. & PUB. POL'y 587,600 (2006) ("A patent allows its owner to extract monopoly rents for

the period of exclusivity."); Sean McElligott, Addressing Supply Side Barriers to Introduction of New
Vaccines to the Developing World, 35 AM.].L. & MED. 415, 426 (2009) ("[Ilnnovator firms are
granted periods of market exclusivity, through patents, in order to allow them to charge
monopoly prices to recoup sunk R&D costs .... "); David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy
and Reverse Payment Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. LJ. 1303, 1306 n.19
(2010) ("A brand company's patent allows it to set high monopoly prices .... ").
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would allow others to continue working with that gene to develop new tests
or extract new useful information from it. The limited rights available
through the FDA would then address the fear of those concerned with the
"anti-commons. "
Third, the proposal also satisfies the criterion of being easy to
administer. The FDA already does (or is seriously contemplating doing)
much of what I propose. It already reviews many genetic tests as medical
devices and asserts the authority to regulate genetic therapies. The only
additional burden on the applicant would be to seek a license, and the FDA
would either issue or withhold one depending on the novelty of the test or
treatment. Adjudicating novelty based on the hybridization properties of
particular DNA molecules would also be easy. Complex legal analysis such as
that conducted by the Patent Office in evaluating applications for
compliance with the non-obviousness requirements would not be necessary.
A simple experiment that would confirm whether or not the later filer's
product hybridizes to the same sequence as a pioneer's product would
suffice.
Finally, the requirement that exclusivity be product-based rather than
data-based makes the regime nearly impossible to evade. Again, the test for
approving or denying the later filer's application would be simple. If its
product hybridizes to the same DNA sequence as the pioneer's product then
no approval can be granted, and the later filer cannot enter the market until
the pioneer's exclusivity expires. This preclusion would be in place
irrespective of whether the later filer conducted his own studies, has his own
data, or any other factors.
The difficulty of evading the FDA-based exclusivity system that I propose
has an additional salutary effect. Because this system will be rather
straightforward and provide all applicants with an easy and inexpensive way
to determine the likelihood that their application would be approved by the
FDA, litigation costs would be reduced. Currently, the average cost of patent
litigation exceeds $3 million,4l7 This money could be better spent on further
research. After all, the parties to patent litigation on DNA are both likely to
be invested in the market with neither being a "non-practicing entity."4 18
Given that pharmaceutical patents are among those most often subject to

417. See Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable
Royalty Patent Damages, 20lO BYU L. REv. 1661, 1725 ("[TJhe average cost of patent litigation
was approximately $3.1 million.").
418.
Cf Kyle Gross, Note, Game On: The Rising Prevalence of Patent-Related Issues in the Video
Game Industry, 12 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 243, 243, 269 (2009) (noting that in
pharmaceutical industries, entities that enforce their patents are the pharmaceutical companies
who actually manufacture the drugs, whereas in high-tech industries, the manufacturers are
often defendants in lawsuits brought by non-practicing entities).
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litigation,4 19 the certainty of the FDA-based rule and the litigation savings
associated with that certainty would be very beneficial to all participants in
the market.
In addition to meeting the above criteria, the system is consistent with
the underlying philosophies of intellectual property discussed in Part III.
Most obviously, the proposed system is justifiable on Benthamite utilitarian
grounds. When properly administered, the system would permit the
developer of a new product to recoup the investment in development and
testing while also making a profit on the invention. The benefit will thus
accrue directly to the inventors and indirectly to the public at large through
the inventions. Though the public will pay monopoly rents for products
subject to the FDA-based exclusivity provisions, this detriment would actually
be narrower than in the patent system because the exclusivity provisions
would apply to specific rather than all uses of the product in question.
Therefore, the aggregate price the public will pay for the benefit obtained
would actually be lower with the FDA-based exclusivity rights than with
patent rights. Overall, then, the system is a better bargain for the public at
large and, consequently, provides even greater utility than the patent system.
The grant of exclusive market rights to the pioneer genetic tests or
treatments is also consistent with the Lockean approach to property rights as
it rewards the innovator for his labor in devising, testing, and bringing a new
product to market. Simultaneously, it does not over-reward him because it
withholds the grant of exclusive rights on products of nature and the
obvious inventions that follow from those naturally occurring products. In
the same vein, my proposal fits within the Hegelian justification for
intellectual property as it lets inventors properly and fully propertize (and
monetize) their ideas. However, by limiting the rights granted only to the
product that is actually developed rather than to a broader universe that
would encompass all uses of an isolated gene, the proposed system does not
permit one to propertize that which is not his idea and therefore should not
rightly belong to him.
Finally, the proposed system satisfies Rawls' requirements for a just
system of property. As discussed previously, the patent system can be
justified on the Rawlsian view of a just society, despite the fact that it
produces economic inequality. A fortiori, then, my proposed FDA-based
system is justifiable because it is more beneficial to the least well-off than the
patent system. By withdrawing a smaller set of knowledge from common
property than the patent system does, the FDA-based system limits monopoly
rents to a smaller class of products than the patent system would.
Consequently, the least well-off would pay a lower price for some products in

419. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent
System, 82 B.U. L. REv. 77, 137 (2002) ("[Bliotechnology and pharmaceutical patents are more
frequently litigated than patents in other industries .... ").
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the FDA-based system than they would in the patent-based system. With a
greater ability to pay for products not subject to exclusivity provisions, the
least well-off in society would have greater access to these goods and
therefore be better off than they would be under the traditional patent
system.
In summary, with respect to genetic material, the FDA-based exclusivity
system can provide innovators with all of the benefits of the patent system
while leaving more information in the public domain, and it can ensure that
holders of exclusive rights actually practice their invention. Furthermore,
these goals can be accomplished at a lower transactional cost than with the
patent system as both the cost of obtaining valuable exclusive rights and
defending them would be dramatically lowered.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The science of molecular genetics continues to challenge the longaccepted standards and rules of the patent law. The basic unit of molecular
genetics-a molecule of DNA-is unlike any other chemical entity in that it
has both chemical and informational properties. It is no surprise that
determining how patent law should treat this molecule has been the subject
of much debate.
Ultimately, though, with the scientific advancements of the last few
decades, the patent-law question is resolving itself. Even if DNA is treated as
a patent-eligible subject matter, it is unlikely to find much protection in the
bosom of patent law because sequencing genes has become so routine as to
no longer be inventive. In this sense, the patent system actually underprotects and therefore under-incentivizes investment and work in the field
of molecular genetics. On the other hand, to the extent that some DNA
sequencing may overcome the obviousness bar, the patent system overprotects and over-incentivizes the investment in this field as it allows the
patentee to essentially limit access to that which is not truly his invention.
A new system is needed-one based on the desire to properly
incentivize the work of pioneers in molecular genetics, while maintaining
due regard for the need to permit access to genetic materials for further
research. That system can be built by having the FDA regulate market entry
for the makers of genetic diagnostic and therapeutic products. By allowing
developers of new tests and treatments to enter the market on a preferential
basis, as compared to later applicants, the system will permit innovators to
enjoy monopoly rents much like they would under the patent system. At the
same time, by limiting the monopoly to the market for diagnostics and
therapeutics, the alternative FDA-based system would permit further
research unfettered by the need to spend resources on licensing patents that
encompass genetic materials. This new approach would finally resolve the
debate on the patent eligibility of genetic materials and place all parties in a
more advantageous position than they currently enjoy.

